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Abstract
The initial public offering (IPO) underpricing phenomenon has frequently been
noticed and generally is accepted as a puzzle in nancial economics. Some of the new
theories, such as behavioural nance, take the underpricing puzzle as one important
form of evidence. However, some aspects of IPO underpricing have not yet been fully
documented and discussed in the existing literature. This thesis tries to contribute in
the following three specic areas.
First, we focus on the time series properties of the level of underpricing of IPO
shares and document the IPO market in the Hong Kong market from 1999 to 2005.
In the data sample, strong autocorrelation within the level of underpricing has been
discovered. Evidence suggests the initial selling volume plays an important role in the
relationship. The links between underpricing and clustering of IPOs within different
industries are weak, suggesting the reasons for underpricing are related to the market
liquidity rather than to the industry-specic risk characteristics.
Second, we investigate the underwriting networks to explore the relationship be-
tween underwriting business and IPO related puzzles. We nd that in repeated IPOs,
underwriters build up reputation and accumulate knowledge of their underwriting ser-
vices. One of the great advantages of the top ranked underwriters is their relationship
networks with other underwriters and institutional investors. We perform a careful ex-
amination of the underwriter syndicate and investigate the relationship of the structure
of the syndicate in respect of IPO performance. Moreover, the pattern of distribution
in the size of syndicates is identied and is found to be signicantly related to the IPO
performance. The research shows that the perspective from the underwriter syndicate
is not only interesting, also necessary to understand IPOs.
Third, we analyse the coordination problem in the IPO. In the research, we con-
sider the auction method as a one-stage selling and the bookbuilding method as a
two-stage selling method. The model suggests that the relationship between the un-
derpricing level and the quality of IPO shares is non-monotone. This implication is
consistent with empirical observations. In addition, regarding the issuers' proceeds in
the IPOs, the auction method is better than the bookbuilding method in both noisy and
noisy vanishing equilibria. The bookbuilding method may be helpful in other ways,
such as maintaining liquidity or price support in secondary market.
By studying liquidity, business networks and the coordination problem, the thesis
does not only complement the existing research by providing unique explanations for
the IPO underpricing and other related puzzles, but also opens some interesting venues
for future research.
JEL Classications: G14; G11; G24; G32.
Keywords: IPO; underpricing; clustering; liquidity shock; underwriter syndi-
cate; random graph; coordination problem; global game.
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1Introduction
Underpricing of initial public offerings (IPO) can seem too remote to worry
about, even for rms that are planning to go public; or too uncertain, in the sense
that the level of underpricing varies over time and is unpredictable. On the long jour-
ney from making the decision to going public and ling the IPO forms, the rm might
think that the underpricing level is not important as the underpricing level is at less
than 10 per cent and the rm gets more than 90 per cent of the investment. You have
to pay for underwriting fees and other fees anyway.
These comforting thoughts, however, cannot prevent the severe facts. Although
the level of underpricing is on average small, we have a huge cake of IPOs. For ex-
ample, Baidu.com, a search engine company based in Beijing, listed in NASDAQ in
2005, raised $109 million in its IPO. If we look at other countries, during the year of
2005, IPOs raised $33,086 million in United States, $24, 263 million in China, $6,231
million in Japan and $2,903 million in South Korea. Looking at regions and areas, the
total funds raised in IPOs in 2005 is $61 billion in Asia, $41 billion in Europe and $39
billion in North America. Globally, we can nd that 24 IPOs raised more than $1 bil-
lion. 1 Given the cake is huge, even a very small bit of underpricing would leave a
great amount of money on the table. Taking the 10 per cent underpricing as average, it
is estimated that at least $2.4 billion were left on the table by the underpricing of IPO
shares in the year 2005.
1 Ernst & Young, 2006, Accelerating Growth: Global IPO Trends 2006, www.ey.com/ipo
2Moreover, sometimes we see huge underpricing. Let us take Netscape's IPO in
August 1995 for an example. In this IPO, 5 million shares of Netscape were sold to
investors at the price of $28.00 per share. At the end of the rst trading day, how-
ever, the closing price was $58.25. On that day, $151 million were left on the table
and collected by the lucky subscribers in the primary market. Netscape's IPO is not
unique. According to Loughran and Ritter (2003), during the internet bubble period
of 1999-2000, the average underpricing level was 65%. Before this crazy period, the
underpricing level was at 7 per cent in 1980s and 15 percent during 1990-1998.
In respect of the de facto signicant amount of money on the table, it is now
hard to tell if all the investments are efcient. Think back to 1999 when the internet
bubble began. All the investors at that time were not chasing protable projects, but
IPO shares. No matter what was there in the IPO shares, a "dot com" label was enough
to make the "buy" order. On the contrary, relatively less money could be invested
into other protable industries. It thus seems that in the IPOs, underpricing of shares
suggests that underwriters do not fully incorporate all available information into the
offer price. As we all know, the mispricing of assets leads to inefcient investments.
An inefcient investment means you pay too much more than it is worth, or too little.
It is easy to understand the inefciency, but difcult to accept the existence of
mispricing in the world of arbitrage. Academic nancial economics theory has been
3long established on the efcient market hypothesis. In the efcient market hypothe-
sis, the risks are incorporated into asset prices. Arbitrageurs can buy the underpriced
shares and then sell them, when the price is right. Rational expectations were a per-
fect tie between nance and the entire economy in the theories of the 1970s. At that
time, Merton (1973), Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979) published their famous work
on the framework of rational expectations in succession. The efcient market theory
thus dominates nance theory. Almost at the same time, however, we can see the be-
ginning of reporting anomalies, such as stock market returns' serial dependencies and
close end fund puzzles. Among those puzzles, IPO underpricing is one of great im-
portance. Consequently, research into the IPO underpricing puzzle also has theoretical
implications. (Shiller, 2003)
The Scope of the Thesis
We would like to focus on the IPO underpricing related issues, from the critical ques-
tions the efcient market theory needs to face. Specically, we investigate into the
following three factors: liquidity, information and risk.
One of the most important assumptions of the efcient market is that we live in
the world of arbitrage, where the arbitrageurs can prot from the mispriced assets. The
premise of the arbitrage world is that arbitrageurs can borrow as much as they wish,
while behavioural nance theory argues that in the real world arbitrage is limited. The
4liquidity is thus an important factor to be explored in these puzzles. In this thesis,
we collect information about a series of IPOs to investigate whether there is series
dependence from the perspective of liquidity.
Information ows are difcult to detect by empirical studies; however, investiga-
tions into information channels are possible. Underwriters' connections with investors,
especially institutional investors, and other underwriters are believed to be of impor-
tance. The underwriters' network is the channel for the information about IPO shares
to be gathered and then distributed. It is easy to gure out the channel, but difcult to
characterise and measure it. Among existing network analysis techniques, we try to
implement a proper one. We expect to see the inuence on the IPO performance from
different underwriters.
Risks associated with IPO shares are generally believed to arise from investors'
sentimental and poor historical information about the shares. Although literature on
IPO risks are extensive, few noticed that failure of the IPO is one of the possible out-
comes. Here we try to investigate the coordination risk during the offering processes.
Given that a certain amount of shares needs to be sold out at once, it is interesting to
know about the possibility of the failure. Meanwhile, we should also notice that un-
derwriters, who suffer from the failures, must try their best to prevent an IPO from
failing due to the coordination problem. As a result, it is also possible to understand
5the puzzling mechanism of IPO, including bookbuilding and the separation of primary
and secondary markets, from the perspective of the coordination risk.
Outline of the Thesis
We review the literature on IPO related issues in the rst chapter. In the review, we
focus on the advantages of choosing IPO as a way of raising funds, and then discuss
other possible choices besides going public, such as private offering. Furthermore, we
compare the internal capital market with the external capital market. Then the review
continues by focusing on the IPO related puzzles, mainly on the underpricing puzzle,
and surveys the offering mechanism globally. At the end of Chapter 1, we review the
theoretical literature on IPO underpricing.
In Chapter 2, we start to study the liquidity factor of IPO shares from the em-
pirical evidence in the Hong Kong market from 1999 to 2005. From the time series
dependence of the underpricing level, we nd that it is reasonable to believe that liq-
uidity is signicantly inuential in the level of underpricing. Together with IPOs'
clustering, evidence suggests that the issuers tend to choose the specic time to go
public. Empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the initial selling volume leads
to more severe underpricing. We believe that in some sense, underpricing is a kind of
compensation for the liquidity shock in the market caused by a huge amount of selling
shares.
6Chapter 3 examines the information ow during the offering from the perspective
of the underwriter network. First we develop unique measurements to characterise the
underwriter syndicate and then examine the inuence of different characteristics on
the IPO performance. Second, the distribution of syndicate size illustrates that there
are two groups of underwriter syndicates, and that the performance of the two groups
differs signicantly. The research shows that the perspective from the underwriter
syndicate is not only interesting, but also necessary. Underwriters, as information
channels, are indeed important to the underpricing puzzle.
In Chapter 4 we consider the coordination risk in the IPO offering by imple-
menting global game theory. We provide the explanation of underpricing from the
perspective of the coordination problem as well as the non-monotone relationship be-
tween underpricing level and the quality of IPO shares. The implication of the model
is consistent with empirical observations. We also examine the issuers' proceed in the
auction method and the bookbuilding method in the model. The nding suggests that
the issuers' proceeds are higher in the auction than in the bookbuilding method. Nev-
ertheless, we only consider two selling methods from the perspective of global games
in the model. The bookbuilding method can be helpful for issuers in other ways.
Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the research and then concludes with the
outlook for further research in IPO related puzzles.
7Chapter 1
Literature Review
Just as with famous puzzles in other elds, IPO underpricing is attractive for
scholars. The level of underpricing is, on the one hand, money left on the table.
Investors' investment in the primary market increases dramatically on the rst day
of trading in the secondary market. The following information about the top 10
biggest underpricing cases during 1975-2004 in the U.S. market explains the rea-
son why this puzzle is so popular: Va Linux, 697.50%, 1999; Globe.com, 606%,
1998; Foundry Networks, 525%, 1999; Webmethods, 507.50%, 2000; Free Markets,
483.33%, 1999; Cobalt Networks, 482%, 1999; MarketWatch.com, 474%, 1999;
Akamai Technologies, 458%, 1999; Cacheow, 426.56%, 1999; Sycamore Net-
works, 386%, 1999.2 On the other hand, the IPO underpricing puzzle challenges
the classic theory in nancial economics, the efcient market hypothesis (EMH).
Scholars could have the chance to show the power of their theories if they could suc-
cessfully explain this puzzle. Among the relevant theories, behavioural nance is a
relatively successful one. As the proposed explanations for the puzzle are numerous,
we list some of them in Table 1.1.3
In this chapter, we review the literature on IPO-related issues as well as the
practice of IPO in the nancial market. In addition, we focus on the advantages
2 Ritter, Jay, 2008, "Big IPO Runups of 1978-2006", University of Florada, Working paper.
3 Summarized by Brau and Fawcett (2006).
8No. Explanations Research paper
Tinic, 1988
Hughes and Thakor, 1992
Drake and Vetsuypens, 1993
Beatty and Ritter, 1986
Rock, 1986
Booth and Chua, 1996
Brennan and Franks, 1997
4 To allow for the creation of a blockholderfor increased monitoring Stoughton and Zenchner, 1998
Benveniste and Spindt, 1989
Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990
Spatt and Srivastava, 1991
6 Issuers are pleasantly surprised with theamount they can raise in the IPO Loughran and Ritter, 2002
7 To start a domino or cascade effect amonginvestors Welch, 1992
8 To allow for cost saving in other areas ofmarketing the issue Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001
9 To increase the post-issue trading volumeof the stock Boehmer and Fishe, 2001
10 To bring attention to the stock on theopening day Demers and Lewellen, 2003
Maynard, 2002
Griffith, 2004
Aggarwal, 2003
Fishe, 2002
Krigman et al., 1999
To protect against possible future
litigations by investors
To compensate investors for taking the
risk of the IPO
To ensure a wide base of owners
To allow for flipping by favored investors
To allow for spinning
To reward investors for divulging accurate
valuation information
11
12
1
2
3
5
Table 1.1: List of theories and explanations for IPO underpricing
9of choosing IPO as a way of raising funds, and then discuss other possible choices
besides going public, such as private offering. Furthermore, we compare the inter-
nal capital market with the external capital market. The review then focuses on the
IPO-related puzzles, mainly on the underpricing puzzle, and surveys the offering
mechanism globally.
1.1 Going Public
1.1.1 An important step for a rm
Being a public company means much more than opening a new channel of raising
funds and diversifying the structure of your shareholders. Not only are you going to
see many strangers on the board of the rm, but your company will be put under the
light spot for all potential investors' careful examination. Everything you are going
to face starts with the important step: Initial Public Offering (IPO).
The advantages of IPO are plenty. Going public enables a company to raise
fund from public equity and opens an avenue for trading the company shares. Pub-
licly traded shares make it easier for the existing shareholders of the company to
liquidate their holdings for cash, or diversify their portfolio, which is essentially the
goal of some venture capitalists. The publicity of being a public held company will
also build up a good reputation for the company. Meanwhile, the ability to raise large
funds from the capital market is also one of the key reasons why companies are ea-
10
ger to go public. One of the many by-products is that by having diversied investors,
a company is able to build up its business network and tighten its connection with the
suppliers and clients.
1.1.2 Alternative choices
It is well known that going public is costly and that it is not an easy call to make.
One alternative way of nancing a project would be using private nancing, such
as venture capital. Chemmanurz and Fulghieri (1999) examine this question for the
rst time, while previous discussions about being a publicly held rm rarely mention
the difference between raising fund from the public and through private placement to
institutional investors, such as venture capitalists. These authors start their research
by focusing on three basic differences between private and public rms.
First, public rms are generally associated with more dispersed share owner-
ship. The dispersed ownership may lead to two consequences. One is that the equity
holders are diversied, in respect of their investment judgement and expertise. The
other consequence is that the diversied shareholders will have much less bargaining
power against the rm's management than a limited number of block shareholders in
private rms.
Second, it is even more costly to convince a much larger group of investors that
its projects are worth investing in than to sell shares to the public. The cost of selling
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results in a greater cost of nancing, which ultimately lowers the protability of the
project and forms a burden for investors.
Third, the public market trading of shares produces a publicly observable share
price. The difference is straightforward. The public market in the paper is the place
where rms are able to sell equity to numerous investors, each with a relatively small
proportion of shares, while the private placement of equity is block selling. It is
thus believed that in the above settings, a private placement to large investors has the
advantage of minimising the information production cost, while the disadvantage of
private placement is that the block shareholder will have greater bargaining power
and will require a greater rate of return on the equity. Some interesting implications
can be drawn from their model. On the one hand, the public rms are not only older
on average than the private rms, but also larger in market value. On the other hand,
the ages when rms go public differ in different industries. Firms in a more capital-
intensive industry go public earlier. Given the capital-intensive degree at the same
level, the rms, which is more difcult to evaluate, will go public later. In addition,
the model implies that rms in different countries (with different nancial market
and nancial institutional regulations) go public at different ages.
For example, the average age when rms in European countries go public is
older than in the U.S. This prediction is veried by the facts documented by Pagano,
Panetta, and Zingales (1998). They found that the average age for Italian companies
going public during the period 1982 to 1991 was 33.4 years, while in the U.S., the
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average age was 6.7 years for venture capital backed rms and 11 years for non-
venture capital backed rms (Gompers, 1993; Lerner, 1994).
Another alternative way is to nance projects by cash ow from the rm itself,
which is the rst thought when a rm needs to nance a project. This notion is ex-
tensively discussed in the series of papers entitled "The Dark Side of Internal Capital
Market" by Scharfstein and Stein in 1998 and 2000. It is believed that theoretically,
there are two capital markets, one internal and the other one external. Once facing
difculties in nancing, besides seeking help from the external capital market, a rm
normally can choose to join or be acquired by a holding group or a conglomerate
group.
Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998) document the evidence that reveals
that conglomerates' headquarters do engage in active resource reallocation and move
funds from one division to another. Obvious evidence is that of the new holding
groups in emerging markets, especially East Asia, such as Japan and South Korea.
Let us take Japan here as an example. According to Hoshi, Kashyap and
Scharfstein (1991), there has been six large industrial groups in Japan since the
1950s: Mitsubishi, Mistui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Dai-ichi Kangyo, and Sanwa. An im-
portant feature of these groups is that they are both diversied and vertically inte-
grated. The Mitsubishi group, for example, has member rms in the automobile,
beer and chemical industries. Among the top 200 Japanese rms, 89 rms have
strong business connections with one of the six largest groups. These 89 Japanese
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rms take 40% to 55% of total sales in the natural resources, primary metal, indus-
trial machinery, chemical and cement industries. Moreover, afliated rms do much
of their business within their group. As estimated by Gerlach (1987), the afliated
rms are three times more likely to do business with other rms in their group than
with unafliated rms.
However, there are also some disadvantages in the internal market. It is nor-
mal to see the internal capital market playing a very important role in conglomerate
groups. In such groups, it is generally believed that the management agencies are
more likely to make inefcient investment decisions. One reason for this is that man-
agers can do a worse job in investment within conglomerate groups. Given that some
believe managers are likely to over-invest using the free cash ow, the conglomer-
ate groups offer the managers a larger free cash ow to play with. Another reason
might be inefcient cross subsidies. As the conglomerate groups have a large free
cash ow, the cross divisional subsidies may be favourable to some divisions while
other divisions are neglected.
Specically, Scharfstein and Stein emphasise the rent seeking in the holding
group hierarchies, claiming that the managers in charge might derive personal bene-
ts from rent seeking in such internal investment and reallocate funds to the "weak"
projects. In the paper, Scharfstein and Stein build a model with two layers of agen-
cies, focusing on the question of how divisional managers apply fund allocations
from their CEOs. Their model not only provides a theoretical framework for analysis
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of the existence of the inefcient internal capital market, but also makes predictions
regarding the direction of such cross subsidies and the circumstance in which the
cross subsidies are likely to occur. They predict that in the conglomerates where the
divisions' strengths are diverged, the inefcient cross subsidies are more likely to
happen.
Rent seeking will ultimately lead to the inefcient allocation of investment
spending. Ultimately, the inefciency of investment spending and rent seeking con-
tribute to the cost of nancing. As a result, as recorded by Bhagat, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1990), and Berger and Ofek (1996), the diversied rms with a greater inter-
nal capital market apparently have a lower trading price in the nancial market than
their specialised peers.
The advantages of the internal market are also widely discussed. Williamson
(1975) argues that internal capital markets provide headquarters with valuable ex-
ibility to reallocate funds from less desirable projects to more desirable ones. In
addition, if the group has projects in related businesses, the informational asymmetry
between headquarters and projects is greatly reduced and thus the headquarters can
allocate the resources better. This also reduces the incentive for poorly performing
projects to expand.
Stein (1997) believes the rationale for the existence of the internal capital mar-
kets lies in a credit-constrained setting. In such a setting, not all positive net-present-
value (NPV) projects can be nanced. Consequently, the headquarters can create
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value by actively reallocating funds across different divisions to give more help as
needed. The second assumption of the model is that the headquarters have the in-
centive and the authority to reallocate resources between different divisions. Based
on the model, Stein argues that where the external markets are relatively underde-
veloped in respect of information and agency problems, the internal capital markets
tend to be the most effective arrangement. Further to the distinction between head-
quarters and bank lenders, following Diamond's (1984) model, Stein notes that the
headquarters' primary task is to reallocate a xed pool of funds, while the purpose of
bank lenders is to bring more funds to some individual projects.
Moreover, Khanna and Tice (2000) argue that since managers are less likely to
lose their jobs than in a less diversied rm, they are more likely to make decisions
that increase rm value. As a result, the internal capital market in related diversied
groups should be more efcient. Khanna and Tice (2001) report their observation
of retail industry rms based on Wal-Mart's entry from the perspective of internal
market efciency. They believe since Wal-Mart's entry into a new market can be
seen as exogenous, the competitors' performance can be interpreted as the response
to the shock. The authors compare the competitors' investment decisions around the
time of Wal-Mart's entry and nd that: rst, focused and diversied rms are similar
in size and in debt levels before the shock but diversied rms are signicantly more
productive than those they are compared with. Second, after the shock, diversied
rms make decisions more quickly to either stay and ght, or to exit the business.
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If staying, diversied rms invest more and their decisions are more sensitive to
productivity.
1.2 Empirical Studies on IPO Puzzles
1.2.1 The underpricing puzzle
As early as the 1970s, Ibbotson (1975) documented the underpricing phenomenon of
IPO shares. He tests the hypothesis that new shares seems to be issued at a lower
price than the market price in the secondary market and found that the newly offered
shares is on average discounted by 11.4%. Later, Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) found that
compared to the market return, IPO shares got 16.8% excess return on average. In
concluding these ndings, Ibbotson rst described the newly offered shares' discount
as a "mystery".
In another empirical study, Beatty and Ritter (1986) record that in the period
from 1977 to 1982 in the U.S. market, for "hot issues" the oversubscription ratio is
as much as 20. The authors note that while many IPO shares shoot up in price on
the rst trading day, many other issues' prices decline. Thus, given that the average
IPO share prices are underpriced in primary markets, investors are not guaranteed
to prot on the rst day of trading in secondary markets. Considering a model of
an equilibrium underpricing level, it is reasonable to believe that the underpricing
is the compensation for the "ex ante uncertainty". The greater ex ante uncertainty
17
leads investors expecting for a greater underpricing level. In the empirical study, the
authors employ two proxies for the ex ante uncertainty. The rst one is the number
of uses of proceeds published as the result of Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) regulations. Firms are reluctant to publish very detailed information about
the use of their net proceeds for the two following reasons: legal liability and the
disclosure of information to competitors. The second proxy used is the inverse of the
gross proceeds raised in the IPO. The latter proxy captures the relationship that on
average, smaller offerings are more speculative than larger ones.
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Figure 1.1: Average monthly underpricing level from 1960 to 2006
Throughout the period from 1960 to 2003, the quarterly average underpricing
level in the United States market for IPO shares is between 10 and 20 per cent, and
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Figure 1.2: Average underpricing level in global nancial markets for IPO shares
it varies over time. (Figure 1.14) Moreover, underpricing is observed world wide,
among both developed markets and emerging markets. According to Ljungqvist
(2004), in the period 1990-2003, the IPOs were underpriced on average by 11 per
cent in Austria, and by 9 per cent in Denmark. In Asia-Pacic and Latin American
markets, the statistic data illustrate that the underpricing level in Hong Kong for ex-
ample is 18 percent during the period 1990 to 2001, and 89 per cent in Malaysia.
(Figure 1.25)
4 Source: Jay Ritter, "Monthly number of IPOs and the average rst day return", http://bear.cba.u.edu/ritter,
Jan, 2006.
5 Source: Jay Ritter, "Average rst day returns for 39 countries", http://bear.cba.u.edu/ritter, up-
dated in 2008. Please note that the data from different markets may be collected during various periods
due to the availability of data.
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Besides the underpricing puzzle, nancial economists have considered a num-
ber of empirical phenomena associated with underpricing puzzle, such as long-term
underperformance and aftermarket liquidity. In this review, we highlight the follow-
ing major puzzles in the existing literature: share allocation in the primary market;
IPO cycle and seasonality; long run underperformance.
1.2.2 IPO share allocation and oversubscription
As the offering price is the same to all investors, and the demand generally exceeds
the supply in the primary market, it is entirely the underwriters' call as to how to
allocate IPO shares to investors. Koh and Walter (1989) perform the rst careful
examination on the allocation issues. They test the allocation of IPO shares related
to the underpricing level during the period of the 1970s and 1980s. Their research is
conducted with a sample of data from the Singapore IPO market, a special market in
the sense that all investors apply for the same number of shares and all have an equal
chance. In addition, the allocation policies are publicly available. Nevertheless, in
other markets, such as that of the U.S., the allocation policy of underwriters is strictly
restricted as regards the public.
From their investigation, the authors nd that the uninformed investors' returns
are not signicantly different from the risk-free rate of return in the market. Their
observation is consistent with the prediction that underpricing as a source of excess
return eventually produces an equilibrium offer price, which can attract uninformed
20
investors to the issue. Moreover, their analysis suggests that the offer price in primary
markets is set above the uninformed investors' estimated price.
Saunders and Lim (1990) conrm the allocation problem with updated data
from the Singapore market. Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) suggest that according
to the requirement of the Singapore Stock Exchange, smaller investors are systemat-
ically favourably allocated for IPO shares. In addition, compared with the demand
of small investors, the demand of the large investor is signicantly more sensitive to
the realised level of underpricing. Lee et al. also document that the oversubscription
level is not a function of the underpricing level. In the sample used of 128 IPOs in
Singapore, the median level of over subscription is 14.1 times.
Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) present direct evidence on IPO shares allocation,
which supports the argument that institutional investors dominate the short-run prot
in offerings. Using condential IPO share allocation data from 38 IPOs underwrit-
ten by a single underwriter during the period from 1983 to 1988, the authors nd that
approximately 70% of the shares are allocated to institutional investors. Across IPOs
with different levels of realised underpricing, i.e. "hot" (high underpricing level)
or "cold" (low underpricing level or no signicant mispricing), the institutional in-
vestors' share of the allocation is always at the same level.
On the contrary, the Wall Street syndicate manager, quoted by Business Week6,
estimates that the institutional investors take 80% of shares in highly underpriced
6 Business Week, April 4, 1994, "Beware the IPO Market", Cover Story.
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IPOs and 60% of shares in normally underpriced IPOs. In the same article, John
Markese (president of American Association of Individual Investors) says, "After the
institutional graze the market, there isn't a whole lot left. We've basically suggested
that if you can get [some shares in an offering], you probably don't want it."
Lee et al. (1999) conrm that institutional investors prot a lot from their
favourable allocations of IPO shares. This research is based on the sample of 132
IPOs underwritten between July 1973 and December 1992. The result shows that
the demand by large investors is positively associated with the realised underpric-
ing. They repeat the test applied by Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) and nd that the
proportion of the allocation to institutional investors and the underpricing level are
positively related, though not signicantly so.
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) report evidence found on allocation of IPO
shares from the revision activities from offering prices. With the revision informa-
tion of the IPO offering price, they nd that institutional investors are rewarded with
favourable allocations of the underpriced shares for providing their private informa-
tion on the IPO shares to underwriters. Moreover, they nd that the proportions of
favourable allocations have a nonlinear relationship with both the revisions and the
level of underpricing. Given that all other variables are the same, there is weak evi-
dence that the underpricing diminishes when institutional investors receive more than
10% of the average allocation.
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It is understandable that research into the allocation of IPO shares is performed
in a limited number of markets, because the allocation information of IPO shares
is condential in most global nancial markets. After all, empirical studies mainly
focus on two points. First, is there any signicant relationship between the degree of
underpricing and the distribution of shares among different groups of investors, for
example institutional investors and individual investors? If such a relationship exists,
to what extent, do the underwriters favourably allocate the shares to certain investors
and why is this the case? Second, in different IPOs, such as highly underpriced ones,
can the favourably-allocated investors gain information about the underpricing level
in advance, and adjust their demand accordingly for the shares?
Although a lot of work has already been done, further investigation remains of
importance to IPO research. Such investigation will no doubt, however, be very dif-
cult because of the condentiality of IPO allocation data. The uncovered sample of
IPOs up to now is arguably biased given that the samples of IPOs were not randomly
selected, because in the existing literature IPOs were usually conducted by one, or a
few, underwriters.
1.2.3 IPO cycles and bubbles
In the nature of IPOs, individual rms go to public markets to raise funds. Instinc-
tively, the pattern of frequency of IPOs should be random over time, since rms make
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their decisions independently. However, this is not the case and it seems that there is
an established IPO cycle over time. The "Dot-com" bubble is an example.
The Dot-com bubble is in general characterised by a surprisingly high price
level in the period of one year between 1999 and 2000, and it is named after the
most signicantly overvalued industry: internet service industry. Since the online
companies were usually named using .com, the dot-com bubble is a lively way of
describing that exciting period. Notably, the price level was not the only remarkable
phenomenon in that period. The average level of underpricing of IPO shares, or
so-called rst day return, also reached and broke its historical record in the same
period of the bubble.
As recorded by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002), the underpricing level was
on average at 69% in 1999 and 56% in 2000, while the underpricing level in 1996
was 17%. In the bubble period, the IPOs in the internet industry were on average
at 88%, which is a even surprising level. Along with this abnormal underpricing
level, there are some other unusual characteristics of the bubble period. First, the
insiders' stake before going public shrinks during the bubble period. The insiders'
stake decreased from 63% in 1996 to 51% in 2000, and the CEO stake declined then
more signicantly by more than one half, falling from 22.8% to 11.5%. Second, the
proportion of all internet rms going public increased dramatically compared to all
rms in other industries. Before the bubble, the proportion was 3-12%, compared
with 55% in 1999 and 36% in 2000. Third, the ages of rms going public fell during
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the bubble. The average age of issuers dropped from 14-18 years old in the pre-
bubble period from 1996-1998 to 10-11 years old in the bubble. The median age
fell by a third, from 8-9 years to 5-6 years. The nal remarkable characteristic is
the weakening protability. Measured by the most recent year's net income after tax,
the proportion of issuers with non-positive earnings increased from 43% in 1996 to
more than 75% during the bubble. Figure 1.3 clearly illustrates the seasonality of
IPO market by the number of IPOs.7
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Figure 1.3: Number of IPOs (monthly) in the U.S. market from 1960 to 2006
7 Source: Jay Ritter, "Monthly number of IPOs and the average rst day return", http://bear.cba.u.edu/ritter,
Jan, 2006.
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1.2.4 Long-term underperformance puzzle
Ritter (1991) identies the long-term underperformance puzzle for the rst time.
With a sample of 1,526 IPOs in the U.S. during 1975-1984, he nd the IPO shares
were overpriced in respect of a three-year performance after going public, compared
with their peer rms in terms of size and industry. In a three years' holding period,
the return for 1526 IPO rms was 34.47%; however, the control sample rm's hold-
ing period return was 61.68%. Ibbotson (1975) nds the phenomenon earlier, but did
not identify it as a puzzle. Ibbotson examine the holding period return for a ten year
period with a sample of offerings in the period from 1960 to 1969. He concludes that
for the new issuing rms, there is "generally positive performance the rst year, neg-
ative performance the next 3 years, and generally positive performance the last year".
Buser and Chan (1987) also documented the underperformance. Using data for 1,078
IPOs from 1981 to 1985 in the NASDAQ/National Market System (NMS), they ex-
amine the holding period return for a two year period. The results show that their
sample had a positive average initial return of 6.2% and the market-adjusted mean 2
years' return is 11.2%. Table 1.2 illustrates the difference of ve years performances
between IPO rms and their peers.8
Some researchers, however, report their concerns over the long-term under-
performance conclusion. Barber and Lyon (1997) focus on annual, three-year and
ve-year returns, and argue that many of the event study methods applied to long
8 Source: Jay Ritter, "Return on IPOs during the ve years after issuing, for IPOs from 1970-2003",
May 2005, http://bear.cba.u.edu/ritter
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First six
months
Second
six
months
First year Secondyear
Third
year
Fourth
year Fifth year
Geometri
c Mean
year 1-5
IPO firms 6.2% 0.3% 6.7% 5.3% 10.3% 18.7% 13.2% 10.7%
Size-
matched
firms
5.6% 6.2% 12.2% 14.7% 14.7% 17.3% 15.1% 14.8%
Differenc
e 0.6% -5.9% -5.5% -9.4% -4.4% 1.4% -1.9% -4.1%
Number
of IPOs 7307 7287 7307 7392 6769 6010 5108
Table 1.2: Five year period performance of IPO rms in NYSE, 1970-2003
term performance are conceptually awed and ultimately lead to biased test statis-
tics. They consider two main issues in the research. Calculation of abnormal returns
is the rst. They argue that empirical studies on long-term performance should cal-
culate abnormal returns as the simple buy-and-hold return on a sample rm minus
the buy-and-hold return on the control sample, but not cumulative abnormal return.
Second, they evaluate the methods of developing a benchmark performance for long
run stock returns.
They nd that among three methods of developing benchmark performances,
which could be problematic. Taking the control sample rms as the benchmarks
might lead to observed biases in the following three aspects: new listing bias, re-
balancing bias and skewness bias. Kothari and Warner (1996) also highlight the
aws associated with calculating long-run returns, while they focus more on using
the asset-pricing model of Fama and French (1993).
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Teoh et al. (1998) examined the relationship between managerial factors and
the long-term underperformance of IPO rms. The authors provide evidence based
on this research that issuers with unusually high accruals in the IPO year experi-
enced signicantly poor performance. In addition, issuers with the most "aggressive"
attitudes in earning management performed about 20% less well than the most "con-
servative" ones did.
After all, it seems that the long-term underperformance puzzle is not well un-
derstood yet. At least, existing researchers cannot rule out the possibility of regu-
lation reasons, accounting standards, managerial factors and sample bias, all being
important factors in this puzzle.
1.2.5 Undervalued or overvalued?
The fact that the price of IPO shares jumps about 10% to 15% on average higher
during the rst few days than the price in the primary market is widely accepted
by academic scholars and practitioners. Meanwhile, it is necessary to compare the
offer price or the trading price with their fair values to examine the question of
whether IPO shares are truly underpriced. Clearly, the concept of fair value extends
the comparison to a larger scale and leads to new arguments.
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) dene fair values by using the price
multiples, including price to EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation
and amortization), price-to-scales, and price-to-earnings. The control sample in-
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cludes the non-IPO rms in the same industries. In addition, the authors choose
the industrial peers with similar operating characteristics as the IPO rms. In all,
there are 2,228 IPOs in their sample, collected from 1980 to 1997.
It is important to mention that according to the given criteria of the data sample,
the IPOs are all non-nancial rms and the offer price is greater than ve dollars. It is
not difcult to understand why nancial rms are excluded from their sample, since
the underpricing phenomenon is not obvious in the case of nancial rms. However,
it is not usual to exclude the low offer price IPOs from the sample. The author claims
that low offer price IPOs (smaller IPOs) are more likely to underperform in the
long run, and that a sample including them might provide a lower overall estimate of
the long term performance.
The results reveal that the IPO shares offering prices are systematically over-
valued relative to their peer rms. The results show that in relation to the large cap-
italisation IPOs from 1980 to 1997, the median IPO is overvalued by 14% to 50%.
Because of this result, the authors believe that the IPO investors are over-optimistic
in earnings growth forecasts while ignoring protability when pricing the IPO shares.
However, it is arguable that the research is not well grounded for the following
reasons. First, the authors have not presented evidence to support the claim. The
claim that smaller IPO shares underperform in the long term is not a widely accepted
assumption. Second, excluding the smaller IPOs from the sample might potentially
lead to a de facto sample bias in their study.
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1.2.6 Bookbuilding and auction
Bookbuilding is a tailored mechanism for selling IPO shares. During the period when
the book is open, bids information is collected from investors. At various prices,
which are above or equal to the "oor price" set by the issuer, investors are expected
to write down the number of shares they wish to buy. The process aims at tapping
both wholesale and retail investors. The offer price is then determined after the bid
closing date. According to the demand information provided by investors, the IPO
shares are allocated to investors' accounts.
Only after the offer price is determined and the allocation has been done, the
public trading of the shares is allowed in the secondary market. This process of
issuing initial shares is called "bookbuilding" and it is generally believed that the key
point of bookbuilding is the collection of demand information.
The following is the process of bookbuilding9:
 The issuer who is planning an IPO nominates a lead merchant banker as a
"book runner".
 The issuer species the number of securities to be issued and the price band
for orders.
 The issuer also appoints syndicate members with whom orders can be placed
by the investors.
9 "About bookbuilding", www.lkpsec.com/website/Book%20Building.htm
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 Investors place their order with a syndicate member who inputs the orders into
the "Electronic book". This process is called "bidding" and is similar to open
auction.
 A book should remain open for a minimum of 5 days.
 Bids cannot be entered at less than the oor price.
 Bids can be revised by the bidder before the issue closes.
 At the close of the bookbuilding period the "book runner" evaluates the bids
on the basis of the evaluation criteria which may include: price aggression,
investor quality and earliness of bids.
 The book runner and the company conclude the nal price at which the issuer
is willing to issue the stock and allocate securities.
 Generally, the number of shares is xed, as the issue size gets frozen based on
the price per share discovered through the bookbuilding process.
 Allocation of securities is made to the successful bidders.
The most frequently observed IPOmechanism is bookbuilding, while relatively
few rms choose to use an auction. Google for example is one of the exceptions. In
2004, with help fromWilliam Hambrecht, Google launched its IPO by Dutch auction
on the internet. The rst day return was also as high as 17%. Nevertheless, the
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auction method is rare. In nancial markets, most of rms choose the bookbuilding
method.
It is noteworthy that while various types of auction methods are powerful in
selling most common goods, equities and nancial derivatives, these fail to dominate
the IPO market. Jagannathan and Sherman (2006) report that IPO auction methods
have been implemented in most of the global markets in the past but have been re-
placed by the bookbuilding method in most of the markets over the last few decades.
For example, Italy introduced the auction method in the 1980s and then abandoned
it in 1986. The bookbuilding method was introduced in Italy in 1992 and soon came
to dominate the market.
Up until now, the reasons for bookbuilding have been discussed in the litera-
ture, but no agreement regarding it has yet been reached in academic community.
1.3 IPO Practice: Worldwide Survey
When talking about IPO, we generally refer to the step taken when a rm is going to
offer its shares, existing or freshly issued shares, to the public for the rst time. IPOs
are applicable in almost all the nancial markets in the world; however, the way that
rms offer their shares is restricted by local nancial law and restrictions, and must
follow the method which local investment banks operate. Sometimes the difference
is so tiny that we can neglect it, whereas in some circumstance the difference is huge
and determinant to the outcome of the IPOs, such as the corporate capital structures.
32
Further to IPOs in Europe and the U.S. market, Ritter (2003) summarises the
recent development in both markets and points out the differences in practice of go-
ing public. Of these offerings, one of the major differences between the two mar-
kets in practice is the pricing mechanisms. The proportion of xed-price mechanism
IPOs is declining and the proportional of the bookbuilding mechanism is growing in
the European market, while the bookbuilding mechanism has long been dominant in
America. In the U.S., bookbuilding starts with setting a le price range. Then, under-
writers launch the IPO roadshow process, which usually lasts for about two weeks.
During the roadshow, institutional investors' demand information is collected by un-
derwriters and then issuers and underwriters together decide the offering price in the
primary market by incorporating the market information within their existing infor-
mation set. If the demand from institutional investors is unusually weak or strong,
underwriters can revise the price range, although they need to submit the revised
price range to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The nal price is
usually decided the day before the start of trading. It is not necessary that the offer
price should lie in the le price range. For example, the offer price could be 20% less
or more than the led price range, as Loughran and Ritter (2002) document. Statisti-
cally, one half of the prices are in the led price range, while a quarter of the prices
lie below and a quarter are above the led price range.
Specically, the French IPO market is characterised by "choosing freely". The
government doesn't interfere with the way of selling shares in IPOs, and almost every
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mechanism is employed in the French market, such as xed price, auction and book-
building. The xed price mechanism usually refers to those scenarios where the offer
price is decided before the market demand information is collected, which tends to
lead to a lower level of underpricing than bookbuilding does (Loughran et al., 1994).
In Germany, according to Aussenegg et al. (2003), the IPO market uses a
combination of bookbuilding with a liquid pre-IPOwhen-issued mechanism. For IPO
shares, there is no market price before trading in the secondary market. According
to Ritter (2003), the price of the IPO shares is typically decided seven trading days
later than the setting of the price range. However, for other securities, such as U.S.
Treasury securities, there may be active forward trading before the securities are de
facto offered in the primary market. This kind of market, where investors can buy
and sell securities in a pre-auction, is called "when-issued" market. In most of the
IPO markets, there is no "when-issued" method because of prohibition by law and
securities regulations. Yet this is not the case in Germany.
The interesting aspect of this combination is that bookbuilding in this combina-
tion no longer serves as a channel to detect investors' demand, although the function
of bookbuilding in other circumstances is collecting investors' demands (Benveniste
and Spindt, 1989; Hanley, 1993). In the German IPO market, the "when-issued" mar-
ket has taken over the information collecting function, while bookbuilding mainly
serves as a way of distributing IPO shares.
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In addition, issuers are subject to a "quiet period" after IPO in the U.S. while in
Europe, issuers are not. The "quiet period" refers to the 40 calendar days10 after going
public, during which afliated analysts are prohibited from issuing recommendation
reports. The "quiet period" is designed to avoid the possibility of investors being
misleading by some powerful analysts.
Legal problems also are an important issue when we compare different markets.
For example, Blom (1996), and Ebke and Struckmeier (1994)11 list the differences
among the U.S., U.K., Germany and Netherlands in the legal responsibility of IPO
prospectuses for issuer, underwriter and auditors. In the U.S., under the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1933, regarding the liability of prospectus it is clearly stated
who is responsible for the completeness and correctness of the content. Any party
involved can be sued for their delinquency. In addition, most issuers in the U.S.
seek to avoid predicting future earnings in order to avoid potential lawsuits. The
British case is slightly different. According to the Financial Services Act of 1986, the
prospectus liability is limited to certain parties in the process of the offering, and each
party takes limited liabilities, depending on the notion of whether the information
provided is based on the principle of being "fair and reasonable".
In Germany, under the two acts of the Wertpapier-Verkaufsprospektgesetz and
the Borsengesetz, underwriters are only liable for the securities offered at the is-
10 The quiet period was set as 25 calendar days before the year of 2002.
11 According to the summary by Tjalling van der Goot (2003), since the original documents are in
the Dutch language.
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suance and when in their possession. As such, the auditors' liability is limited to
255,000 Euros per audit, regardless of any other factors. In the Netherlands, there is
no specic law or regulation regarding IPO prospectus liability. Therefore, the liabil-
ity is judged by the principle of tort law or misleading advertising. Because of this
legal system, only nine lawsuits against auditors were reported during the 10 years
between 1983 and 1992. By examining a sample consisting of 92 IPO cases in Am-
sterdam Stock Exchange, Tjalling van der Goot (2003) reports that legal risk is the
reason why high prestige underwriters are not willing to get involved in risky IPOs
in the Netherlands.
The shares offered are also different. In Sweden, most IPOs have dual-class
shares and only the shares with fewer voting rights are sold to public. Holmen and
Hogfeldt (2005) argue that this is the result of the Civil Law legal system because
of the centralised nature of political issues and the legal regime, while in a Common
Law system, the procedures are decentralised. They believe the legal system is the
reason why the dual class shares are issued and as a result, the control means share-
holders' rights are over-protected, while the small shareholders' rights are neglected.
This is also shown in the following statement of the new Swedish Corporate Law12:
"The use of shares with different voting rights has a long tradition in Swedish
law. Dual-class shares are very common among listed companies in Sweden. The
dual-class share system has signicant advantages. It makes it possible (facilitates) to
12 Translated by Holmen and Hogfeldt, 2002.
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have a strong and stable ownership function even in very large companies. Thereby
creating the necessary conditions for an efcient management as well as for the long-
term planning of the rm's activities. Shares with different voting rights also facil-
itate for growing companies to raise new capital without the original owners losing
control. There is no evidence that the dual-class share system has caused any notice-
able negative effects....Dual-class shares can signicantly promote the efciency and
development of individual rms as well as of the business sector in general."
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Year
N
um
be
r o
f I
P
O
s
Privately controlled
Institutionally controlled
Total
Figure 1.4: Frequency of IPOs on the Swedish Stock Exchange between 1979 and
1997 (Source: Holmen and Hogfeldt, 2005)
According to Jagannathan and Sherman (2006), the regulators for Israel's IPO
market assign auction as the only permitted offering method for a decade prior to
December 2003, and the prohibition of the bookbuilding method is currently still
banned. The change in regulations directly resulted in the consequence that there has
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been no equity IPO since 2003. In Turkey, Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) introduced
auction as the way of dealing with IPO for the rst time in 2003. Meanwhile, book-
building, xed price offers, sale through stock exchange and hybrid offerings are the
mechanisms used in equity offerings (Kucukkocaoglu, 2006).
In the Asian IPO market, up to my knowledge, there are few surveys on the
difference between IPOs in this area. As most Asian nancial markets are prema-
ture and changing through time, it could be inspiring when we look at the changes
experienced by these nancial markets.
Kutsuna and Smith (2004) document that in Japan, the bookbuilding method
of IPO was rst introduced as an alternative choice for equity offerings in October,
1997. Before this, a discriminatory auction method was assigned as the only required
method for IPO since 1989. The auction method in Japan is a hybrid of discrimina-
tory auction and xed price offering. About a half of the offering shares are sold by
discriminatory auction and the rest are sold at a lower price than the weighted aver-
age price in the auction to the public. It is notable that within only one month of the
change of regulations, all issuers in Japan chose bookbuilding as the preferred way
of offering. Kutsuna and Smith (2004) believe that in this shift of regime, the pricing
accuracy of IPO shares was improved. It seems that the overvalued rms rushed to
go public before the new system was introduced, since the number of IPOs in Sep-
tember, 1997 is 25 comparing to 12 IPOs in October, 1997 after the bookbuilding
method was available. However, if the total issue cost is measured as the percentage
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of trading price, the average issue cost of IPO in the bookbuilding mechanism is on
average higher than in the Japanese auction method. The issue cost can be interpreted
as the cost of a better price and market efciency.
Chun and Smith (2000) document the South Korean nance market in recent
years. Compared to their peers in the U.S., Korean rms rely more on debt nance
and thus on having a high debt ratio. In South Korea, private rms are not able
to get debt nance easily, thus the equity nancial market provides them with the
opportunity for equity nance. Meanwhile, going public opens up a channel for
rms to gain public information and encourage outside nancing, such as commercial
loans or equity investments. The cost of IPO in South Korea is reported to be about
3% of gross proceeds.
As described by Shah (1995), the Indian IPO market is characterised by the
following features. First, the Indian IPO market has high average underpricing with
105.6% of the documented data. It is worth mentioning that the underpricing level is
quite surprising. Second, the time taken between issue date and the date of trading
in the secondary market is very long, compared to other markets. The typical length
of this period is 11 weeks, and it varies from case to case subject to the size of the
IPO and the market. Third, the rst year returns on IPOs are outstanding in the
market. On average, investors can earn 40% excess return by holding IPO shares
for the rst 200 trading days than holding market index linked funds. The statistical
out-performance of IPO shares in the rst year is a quite unique phenomenon among
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the world nancial markets. The author believes the excess return may reect the
manipulation of trading in the market and more fundamentally the weak nancial
governance, although there is not enough evidence to support this hypothesis.
Among the global nancial markets, China has the most severe documented
IPO underpricing level. Yu and Tse (2006) document that in the sample of 343 IPOs
during 1995-1998, the average underpricing level for A shares13 IPOs is 123.59%.
This is consistent with other empirical studies performed by Ma and Faff (2007).
In exploring the phenomenon, Su and Fleisher (1999) describe some distinguishing
characteristics of new issue shares in China in the 1990s. First, the State Planning
Commission, the People's Bank of China (central bank) and the China Securities
Regulatory Committee (CSRC) determine the annual quota for IPO capitalisations
and volumes. Then the quota is allocated to provinces according to their capital
demand. The rms are selected in respect of their business strength and the local
development goals for achieving the right to go public. Second, only the shares that
are not retained by government and other state-owned enterprises and employees are
permitted to be traded in the secondary market.
On the aggregate level in the market, there are ve types of shares for a rm:
government shares, legal entity shares, employee shares, ordinary domestic shares
(A share) and foreign shares. Among these, the rst three types of share are sold at
the book value of a rm's total assets and are not allowed to be traded. Employee
13 There are two types of shares in China domestic nancial market: A shares and B shares. A shares
are traded with domestic currency RMB for domestic investors and B shares are traded in the U.S.
dollar for foreign investors.
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shares are allowed to be traded only after three years' listing. There are two kinds
of foreign shares, although all foreign shares are designed for foreign investors and
are in foreign currencies. One kind of foreign shares, called B shares, is traded in
domestic markets while using the U.S. dollar. The other foreign shares, called H
shares, are traded in Hong Kong, in Hong Kong dollars. The unique regulations and
arrangement of Chinese rms are no doubt part of the reasons for the severe under-
pricing level. It is worth mentioning that among Chinese new issues, the ownership
is one important factor in the IPO performances. Chau, Ciccotello and Grant (1998)
and Mok and Hui (1998) provide some supportive evidence that suggests that IPO
underpricing is smaller for rms that have retained more government ownership.
1.4 Theoretical Studies Review
It must be painful for the issuers if they believe that they are losing money from the
IPO underpricing, given that the underpricing level is quite signicant. Although it
seems that it is not necessary for issuers to underprice the offering shares signi-
cantly, the issuing rms do leave huge amounts of money on the table for the new
investors in practice. The questions here are obvious. Is it possible that the issuers
would be able to retain the money if they did not underprice the shares? And what is
the right price for the shares in the primary market?
If the fair price of a share is greater than the offer price in the primary market,
the issuer is losing money. Assuming that issuers are rational, it seems that once
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issuers realise they are losing money, they should raise the offering price and thus
stop losing money. However, this is not true in the real world. According to Loughran
and Ritter (2002), and given the fact that during 1990 to 1998 companies going public
lost $27 billion during the IPO, neither issuer nor underwriter subsequently tried to
raise the offer price. A careful investigation revealed that during the same period,
$13 billion, only half of the money lost, was paid to the investment bankers for the
issue fee; and also $27 billion was a bit more than the issuers' accumulated prot
over three years. More interestingly, issuers do not think that the reason for the
underpricing is that the underwriters are incapable of pricing, as evidence suggests
that many investment bankers will serve again as underwriters in the seasoned public
offerings.
Aiming at making sense of the puzzling evidence, Loughran and Ritter suggest
some reasons. First, most IPOs leave relatively little money on the table when going
public. The anticipated price of the IPOs that do leave a lot of money is lower than
the market price, and hence they discover their wealth during the process. Second,
since the offer price only adjusts partially to public information, rst-day returns are
predictable. Third, the IPO underpricing can be explained as an indirect form of un-
derwriter compensation, because investors are willing to gain favourable allocations
on hot deals. The pricing of IPO shares in term of this theory is a bargaining process.
Yet Reuter (2006) argues that the reason for this sale and underpricing is that
it is a part of selling strategy. Reuter believes that the central question of under-
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pricing is whether underwriters use their discretion over IPO allocations to reward
investors while issuers' proceeds are reduced. This question reveals the conict of
interest between underwriters and issuers. He investigates the allocation of under-
priced shares in the IPO by collecting the allocation data across mutual fund families
between 1996 and 1999. Since the IPO allocation data was not publicly available,
this research chose to use the reported mutual fund equity holdings from the same
period to infer the allocation data which is unique. After all, Reuter nds evidence
that suggests the link between reported IPO holdings of mutual fund families and the
level of the brokerage commission payments from the mutual fund families to lead
underwriters was signicant. According to the author's estimate, mutual fund fam-
ilies in the U.S. have received as much as two fths of the total money left on the
table. Overall, this theory highlights the particular agency conict between under-
writers and issuers and points out that the fundamental problem of underpricing is
the agency's conict of interest.
Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) believe that although the underwriters vary the
allocation of IPO shares among different investors, the reason for the allocation is not
conict of interest with the issuer. Their research is based on a unique set of book-
building data consisting of 39 international equity issues, although most "books" are
kept private by underwriters, and the details of bid information and allocation infor-
mation are unknown to the public. The advantage of this evidence is that it gives the
authors the privilege of examining closely the IPO-related questions, such as whether
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the bidders who reveal information are favoured in the allocation of the IPO shares.
This research provides the following explanations for the puzzles. First, investment
bankers reward bidders who reveal more information by allocating them more IPO
shares in primary market. Second, bidders who participate in a large number of is-
sues receive favourable allocations from underwriters. However, there is no evidence
to suggest that the favorably treated investors earn abnormal prots more often than
other investors. The ndings suggest that investors are compensated for their expo-
sure to risk. Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) report similar research investigating the
allocation problem with 38 cases. Jenkinson and Jones (2002) document the alloca-
tion problem with 29 IPO cases.
The follow-up research by Boehmer and Fishe (2004) using a larger data sam-
ple supports this argument. Boehmer and Fishe analyse 1.56 million accounts in 265
IPOs in order to investigate the relationship between underwriters and investors, and
the result is consistent with the previous ndings (Figure 1.5)14.
By and large, there are three major arguments involved in underpricing: behav-
ioural nance, information asymmetry and institutional agreement. We survey these
arguments as well as some other factors, such as legal problems, in the rest of this
section.
14 Adapted from Boehmer and Fishe, 2004.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of participation rate for institutional and retail investors.
1.4.1 Irrational investors: behavioural nance theory
One of the mainstream explanations for the IPO-related puzzles is that the investors
are sentimental. Investors in general may be on average over-optimistic regarding
the newly traded shares, based on the analyst's reports, or over-pessimistic regarding
those shares with insufcient analyst reports or recommendations. After all, investors
do not make investment decisions solely on the quality of the underlying assets or ex-
pected cash ows, as we have learnt from classic economics textbooks. Issuers and
underwriters thus have to make great efforts to send out good messages in the pub-
lic media, such as newspapers. Analysts afliated to the underwriters also try to send
out positive information and higher price predictions to the public in order to reduce
the underwriting risk of their employees. Since the majority of public investors are
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insufciently informed by true information about the rm, the majority of the public
cannot know the fair price of newly offered shares. As the consequence, inten-
sive media coverage must result in a higher trading price of the IPO shares in the
secondary market.
The sentimental investor's story seems to explain everything we observe in the
real world about the IPO of shares. The critical part of this story, however, is that the
assumption of investors is contrary to the classical theory in nancial economics, that
of the rational investors' assumption. This difference leaves some space for another
theory, behavioural nance, to explain. The behavioural nance theory argues that in
some circumstances the economic phenomena could be better explained with models
that assume the agents are sentimental to some extent, instead of fully rational.
In a famous survey of behavioural nance literature, Barberis and Thaler (2003)
summarise the main features of behavioural nance theory. This theory analyses the
scenarios with two presumptions. The rst one is that of the limited arbitrageur,
which argues that rational traders can not easily cancel the misallocations of funds
by less rational traders; the second presumption is of psychological bias, which ex-
plains the observed behaviour deviations from those fully rational expected. In ad-
dition, the authors emphasise that under the limited arbitrageur assumption, rational
investors' rational investment, such as arbitrage, might seem very risky. Hence, if the
market is efcient, and the price is right there will be no arbitrage opportunities; if
the market is inefcient, the price will not be right and there might still be no arbi-
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trage opportunities. If this is the case, limited arbitrage might be the explanation of
IPO underpricing puzzle.
Two supporting sources of evidence for behavioural nance theory are well
discussed in the following literature: "hot market phenomenon" and long-term un-
derperformance.
"Hot market" refers to the period when the underpricing level of IPO shares
is signicantly higher than during a normal period, which was recorded by Ritter
(1984) for the rst time. Ritter investigated the IPO market in the U.S. from 1977
to 1982, and found that from January 1980 to March 1981, the IPO shares were on
average (equally weighted) underpriced by 48.4%. Yet, in the rest of the time during
the investigation period, the average underpricing level was at 16.3%. Moreover, the
greatest underpricing IPOs are clustered in the natural resources industry. If the IPOs
in the natural resources industry are isolated, the hot market becomes insignicant.
According to Ritter's calculation, the underpricing levels for non-natural resource
IPOs were on average at 21.0% in the hot market period, and 15.8% outside that
period. However, the natural resource related IPOs were underpriced on average by
110.9% during the hot market and 18.3% during the cold market.
Ritter (1991) discovered long-term underperformance for the rst time. By
analysing a sample of 1,526 IPOs in the U.S. market during 1975 to 1984, he discov-
ered that the rms going public signicantly underperformed compared with their
peer rms by size and industry. This anomaly is of theoretical interest, if it is veri-
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ed, for the following reasons which Ritter listed in his paper. First, systematically
overpriced IPO shares leave a space for the arbitrageurs to arbitrage from this mis-
pricing in the market. Second, the issue about market efciency in the IPO market
is questioned according to this test result, and the evidence itself supports the newly
developed theory about behavioural nance. Third, the volume of IPOs with large
variations may be associated with long-term performance.
Some other evidence shows that long-term underperformance is usually associ-
ated with IPO shares. Stoll and Curley (1970), Ibbotson (1975) and Stern and Born-
stein (1985) suggest that the abnormal IPO return might be negative in most cases.
Meanwhile, there are also some conicting empirical ndings, which undermine the
credibility of the underperformance puzzle. For example, Ritter (1991) reports that
the underpricing is negatively related to the long term underperformance. However,
in a research that focused on the ippers by Krigman, Shaw and Womack (1999),
and using a data sample of IPOs from January 1988 to May 1995, it is reported that
the relationship between underpricing and long term underperformance is positive.
Moreover, Afeck-Graves et al (1996) examined the relationship between underpric-
ing levels and the three-month returns and also found it is positive.
In the behavioural nance model, as summarised by Barberis and Thaler (2003),
the following risk characteristics are taken into consideration. First, fundamental risk
refers to fundamentals and is subject to the management of the rm, the industry,
macroeconomic factors and other related policies, etc. Second, is noise trader risk.
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The noise trader risk was introduced by De Long (1990) and was further developed
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997). This type of risk refers to short run mispricing when
noise traders are trading actively. Even if the substitute of one stock exists, the ar-
bitrageurs might still face this risk. Noise trader risk is important and arbitrageurs
might be forced to liquidate their positions in some circumstance to limit their loss in
a certain position, although the positions might be correct in the long run. Therefore,
the right decisions bring arbitrage losses.
The liquidity problem is partly due to the agency problem, which is essential
from the contractual view of the rm. Here the agency problem refers to the prob-
lem caused by the separation of ownership and control. The management allocates
funds to productive use, while the investors use the management to generate return
on their funds. In this setting, the problem arises: how can investors be sure that
management efciently allocates their money to generate returns, but does not waste
the money? In order to solve this agency problem, the investors choose to retain the
option to liquidate their holdings when there is an unexpected situation, such as ab-
normal variance in the market. The option to liquidate holdings limits managers'
rights in allocating resources to risky assets. This problem is a so called "separation
of brains and capital" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Third: implementation costs. The implementation cost refers to the cost of
transactions during the trading, such as commissions, ask-bid spread and so on. In
theory, it is expected that implementation costs are small; however, they are not eas-
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ily ignored in the real world. In his research into the market for borrowing stock,
D'Avolio (2002) found some evidence. The good thing is that most stocks are short-
able (available for short trade) in empirical research. Only those illiquid stocks
may be potentially impossible to borrow, which accounts for 16% of all stocks. The
bad thing is that the transaction cost is signicant. Ninety-one per cent of the stocks
borrowed generate loan fees of only 17 basis points annually, while the other 9% gen-
erate loan fees for 4.30% annually. Given that the arbitrageurs wish to eliminate their
risks in real time, the transactions for hedging risk is enormous and the transaction
cost would be considerably greater. Besides the transaction cost, for the majority of
fund managers, short selling is just not allowed. Such borrowing fees and restrictions
on stock borrowings must have prevented the low return arbitrage activities, which
ultimately damages market efciency.
Besides the market situation, the behaviour models are also backed by psycho-
logical explanations. On the one hand, people's beliefs might differ from the facts
that they can actually see. There are many aspects of the strange beliefs in people's
minds. One is overcondence, either being too condent in their beliefs or overesti-
mating the probabilities of good scenarios. For example, as Fischhoff et al. (1977)
recorded, the events which, denitely will happen, in people's minds actually only
occur about 80% of the time while the events people believe will never happen oc-
cur around 20% of time. People will also be prone to overcondence after a period
of success. One other aspect is optimism and wishful thinking. Weinstein's (1980)
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research shows that most people's view of their own abilities and prospects are over-
optimistic. The remaining aspects include representativeness (Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1974; Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky, 1985), conservatism, belief perseverance
(Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979), anchoring and availability biases (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1974).
Although this experimental evidence and other psychological theories might be
helpful for economists, however, we must be cautious and careful in implement the
psychological theories within economic research for the following reasons. Where
there are economic incentives, people are less likely to be affected by psychological
factors. Professional investors or analysts making signicantly fewer biased judge-
ments than ordinary people. People try to avoid their biases when they realise they
have biased minds. Finally, yet importantly, those biases are not going to happen all
at the same time and we cannot say which one is working and when.
On the other hand, how people evaluate the risky aspect of assets is a critical
problem. This is essential for most of the models used in nance theories. Most of
the theories assume that investors evaluate the risky assets according to their expected
utility since Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). According to the expected util-
ity function, the basic requirements are completeness, transitivity, continuity and in-
dependence. In reality, however, much evidence suggests that the investors do not
follow the expected utility functions. Consequently, many efforts have been made
to develop a better function to describe people's evaluations, such as weighted util-
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ity, implicit expected utility, disappointment aversion, regret theory, rank-dependent
utility theories and prospect theory.
Focusing especially on prospect theory, Loughran and Ritter (2002) developed
prospect theory as applied to IPO underpricing and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003)
tested this theory. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm nd that controlling for other known fac-
tors, IPO rms are less likely to change their underwriters for the seasoned equity
offering. This empirical evidence can be interpreted as suggesting that those issuers
are satised with the IPO underwriters' service. Consistent with Loughran and Rit-
ter's argument, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm believe that underwriters participating in
IPOs can gain from the decision-maker's behavioural bias, in the same way that in-
stitutional investors can prot from unnecessarily underpriced shares and share the
prot with underwriters. The underpricing level of the IPOs with which issuers are
satised is on average 41.4%, while the rest are at the level of 6.1% on average.
Meanwhile, the chances are that we do not know at all what will happens the
next day, never mind a while later. We also need to face this ambiguity in the nance
theories. Investors never objectively know the probability of the outcome of invest-
ments. Ellsberg (1961) performed an experiment on the nature of investors' aversion
of ambiguity. The experiment suggests that besides the expected outcomes, people
do not like being in a situation where they do not know the probability distribution of
the outcomes. Knight (1921) discussed this problem and believed that investors dis-
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like uncertainty, and Savage (1954) later developed a theory to describe subjective
expected utility.
1.4.2 Information asymmetry theory
Since IPO rms, usually characterised as young and premature, are usually less well-
known to the nancial market before their IPO, gaining information about them is
one of the most critical problems for their going public. Moreover, compared with
their peers, but existing publicly hold companies, investors will have no information
on the historical price series of a newly public rm. This might also be one of the
reasons for the puzzles that surround IPO shares.
One stream of theories is called adverse selection theory. Some papers, such as
Rock (1986), argue that information asymmetry occurs between different investors.
In response to prior research by Grossman (1976), Rock believes that the assump-
tion that superior private information can be obtained from the publicly observed
equilibrium price ultimately leads to a paradox. In his paper, Rock proposes another
assumption that only when the market price cannot reect the true value of the stocks,
can the insiders prot with their private information by trading the "mispriced" se-
curities. In the model, he discusses the reasons why the issuer is not fully informed
about the price of the shares, although they know a signicant amount about the fu-
ture of the rm. First, the rm publishes its knowledge for the market in the IPO
prospectus, and the underwriters certify that this revealed information is fair by their
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reputation. Second, the investors in the market in many ways may know the market
better than the rms do, although the underwriters and the rms may have superior
information. This leads to an adverse selection being made among the investors, sim-
ilar to Akerlof's lemon market (1970). Only the informed investors will ultimately
prot from IPO shares in this game. Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Carter and Man-
aster (1990) have the similar ndings.
Another stream of theories, such as those of Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), suggest that the information asymmetry is between in-
vestors and issuers. They assume that the most informed participant in the offering is
the rm itself. In their model, there are generally two types of rms: good rms with
a higher expected dividend ow and bad rms with a lower dividend ow. However,
since the rms are normally new and only the rm itself knows its type, investors can
hardly tell the difference between those two rms. Investors can only observe the
price and the proportion of the rm sold in IPO and the dividends at the end of each
period. The consequence of this setting is that the good rms send out a "good" signal
by low IPO prices hoping to "leave a good taste in the investor's mouth". As support-
ive evidence, Welch (1989) reports that about one-third of IPO rms between 1977
and 1982 made their seasoned offerings by 1986 and the typical amount of money
raised was at least three times the initial offering. This is typical evidence suggest-
ing that the existing shareholders are willing to underprice their shares in order to
send out this signal. If the rm can perform well, the trading price of the shares will
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rise eventually, and shareholders can sell their shares at a fair price at the end. Yet
existing shareholders will have no chance to sell at a higher price if the rm cannot
perform well enough.
Michaely and Shaw (1994) test the implications of the winner' curse and sig-
naling based models with a sample of IPOs from 1984 to 1988. The question for
the research was simple: are the informed investors compensated by underpricing
according to the information, or do the issuers need to pass the information of the un-
derlying asset by underpricing? The empirical result suggests the adverse-selection
models are more reasonable and t the data, while the signaling story is little sup-
ported.
Sherman and Titman (2002) show that the underpricing of IPO shares is a
form of compensation for investors' information acquisition costs, since the investors
themselves do not have the information freely available. In the model, they empha-
sise that the underwriter can select a group of investors along with the price and the
allocation mechanism. The purpose of this selection is to maximise the information
gathered during the process of IPO. When the information creating process is costly,
the only way the underwriter and the issuer can compensate is to lower the offer price.
In their model, if the information is less costly, the number of investors in the primary
market will be innite and the underpricing level will be about zero. On the other
hand, when the information is extremely expensive, underpricing of IPO shares will
be at a very high level to compensate for the information cost. Meanwhile, the under-
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pricing level is subject to the demand for accurate information. Greater underpricing
will be set to introduce more investors to acquire more accurate information. The
supportive evidence from James (1997) suggests that the underwriters form investor
groups to repeatedly participate in IPOs.
Schenone (2004) presents a different view that the information about under-
lying assets is ambiguous, and he believes that sometimes the information is just
insufcient and underwriters can not get the right price. However, if the underwriters
had a better knowledge of the issuer and its quality, they would have a better idea of
the price in the primary market. Evidence from banking relationships supports this
theory, showing the existence of information asymmetry between underwriters and
issuer. Schenone tests this theory on a sample of 1,245 rms going public from Jan-
uary 1, 1998 to December 31st, 2000 in the U.S., and nds that a pre-IPO banking
relationship reduces the asymmetric information for the underwriters for the rms
going public. In addition, the evidence reveals that a well-established banking rela-
tionship can reduce by 17% underpricing level for an issuer.
One of the consequences of information asymmetry is that the acquiring infor-
mation is costly. In order to explore the information about the market and the issuers,
someone has to be the pioneer and pay the cost of collecting precise information.
Benveniste et al. (2002) believe that if the pioneer rms going public paid the pri-
mary cost, because market failures can happen, no rm would want to be a pioneer.
The consequence of market failure is that both "pioneers" and "followers" remain
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private and the investment decisions made are not efcient, due to the lack of infor-
mation. They argue that in reality underwriters can solve this coordination problem
on industry sector level. In addition, IPO clustering is one of the by-products of in-
formation asymmetry. It is noteworthy that, the rm itself has its reservation price
for the offering. The reservation price is kept secret, and rms will withdraw the
going-public application if the expected market price is lower than the reservation
price (Brisley and Busaba, 2007).
1.4.3 Shareholder agreement theory
Since some of the shareholders are actively involved in managing companies in gen-
eral, the shareholders may form some agreement on the managerial issues, especially
the issues about nancing. The use of shareholder agreement theory in explaining
IPO-related puzzles has been discussed for the rst time by Bernstein (1988).
As Chemla et al. (2007) summarised, the shareholder agreement theory mainly
focuses on the following four issues. First, shareholders' concern about the option
of putting existing shareholder's stakes to their business partners. Second, the share-
holder may ask for the same treatment for their partners, "tag-along rights". Third,
shareholders may initiate a sale and force their partners to join them in selling, "drag-
along rights". Fourth, shareholders may force other shareholders to agree on going
public, "demand rights". As such, the shareholder agreement theory is relevant to the
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decision of going public and hence may be of importance in exploring the nature of
IPO-related puzzles.
Further to the underpricing puzzle, agreement theory is based on the assump-
tion that the existing shareholders want to introduce new target investors to achieve
their goals. In this sense, the underpricing is purposeful as it serves to attract more
investors and helps select the most desirable ones out of numerous investors.
The intentions of introducing target investors could be two as follows. The rst
reason is to attract investors who are able to aid in acquisitions that are nanced by
the IPO. Brennan and Franks (1997) examine a sample of 69 IPOs in the UK and
nd that underpricing was being used to ensure oversubscription. Evidence suggests
that in a seven year period after going public, directors sell only a modest fraction of
their shares, while most non-directors sell off their holdings. Consequently, up to two
thirds of the shares have been sold to public investors in the period and increasing
the separation of ownership and control. Meanwhile, the issuers discourage investors
from applying for large blocks in the IPO share allocation. In the seven years' period
after going public, evidence suggests that a larger underpricing level leads to smaller
block holders. In a ten-year period after going public, there is a low level of hostile
takeovers, suggesting that the underpricing strategy is successful in preventing hostile
changes of control.
The other intention is to attract investors who are more likely to be favourably
disposed to the rm's business or methods of management. Stoughton and Zechner
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(1998) analyse the inuence of the IPO mechanism on the shareholder structure. By
providing a model of the agency problem, they explore whether the role of underpric-
ing determines the shareholder structure. Taking the underwriters as the active bro-
kers in the institutional investment community, they show that the offering of shares
could bring benets to the entrepreneur in two ways. First, underwriters are able to
distinguish those investors who can monitor the management and provide them with
favourable allocations in the offering. Second, underwriters change the one time of-
fering to a repeated game and thus are able to negotiate directly with large investors
for a better deal for the issuer.
Beside those two purposes, the shareholders hope to disperse the ownership
structure. Booth and Chua (1996) argue that the underpricing is the result of the
demand of the issuer for a dispersed shareholder structure and secondary market liq-
uidity. In the research, the authors report the evidence showing that the underpricing
is positively related to the degree of ownership dispersion. In addition, Stoughton
and Zechner (1998) argue that underpricing allows a change of ownership such that
the possibility of shareholders' monitoring on management is increased.
Dawson (1987) points out that the underpricing may be more severe than ex-
pected, if taking the dilution effect of offering new shares is taken into consideration.
If underpricing did not exist, the market price of the offering shares could be higher
than is the case when underpricing does exist. As a result, it is necessary to imple-
ment a new measure of "issuer-oriented underpricing". Under the new measurement,
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the underpricing level is always greater than the current perception suggests. The
wealth transfer in IPOs due to underpricing may; however, not be as signicant as
would be expected under Dawson's measurement. Barry (1989) points out that the
transfer of wealth involved in underpricing is less severe. As the existing sharehold-
ers participate more actively and sell their shares, the transferred wealth increases.
After all, the selection of target investors will increase the value of the rm.
Unlike the case with the information asymmetry and sentimental theories, this kind
of underpricing is an articial one and the issuers to some extent control the degree
of underpricing.
1.4.4 After-market stability and liquidity
One of the most important results of being a public trading rm is the increased
liquidity of its shares, and it is therefore essential to explore the relationship between
the liquidity of shares of the underpricing level.
Generally, people perceive that a large trading volume is contributed by indi-
vidual investors, or "ippers". Aggarwal (2003) quotes from the Wall Street Jour-
nal, "Traditionally, individuals get between 10% and 20% of IPO shares at the offer
price". Additionally, he presents evidence that the trading volume is indeed high
in the rst few trading days in the secondary market for IPO shares. However, it
seems that ippers are not the main reason for the large volume. With respect to the
IPO shares' trading volume in the secondary market in the rst few days, individual
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investors contribute 19% of the trading volume, and 15% of the share volume. How-
ever, institutional investors ip most of the shares in hot IPOs while their activity is
relatively lower in cold IPOs. Aggarwal interprets this phenomenon as meaning that
the institutional investors do not ip the shares in cold IPOs in order to support the
underwriters' favourable allocations. In general, Aggarwal (2000) points out that the
after-market trading is less transparent and includes stimulation of demand. The ma-
jor channel for demand stimulating is through short covering while the channel for
restricting supply is by penalising the ipping of shares. From the observations, we
can conclude that individual ippers are not included in the penalisations, consider-
ing that it is both difcult and costly to identify individual ippers during sequential
offerings.
Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (2000) emphasise the relationship between under-
writers and market makers in respect of the after-market liquidity. They nd evidence
that the lead underwriter is always the dominant market maker because of taking sub-
stantial inventory shares. In a cold or "less successful" IPO, the lead underwriters use
their inventory to stabilise the after market trading of IPO shares. The underwriting
fee is denitely the primary incentive for underwriters to become involved in the sta-
bilisation activities, while the after-market trading also generates prots at most of
the time.
In some other markets, however, the underwriters do not perform as active
market makers, or are unable to be the market maker. The underpricing of IPO shares
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is therefore not a source of compensation for the underwriters, but may compensate
investors. As the precise after-market liquidity is unknown to the public investors,
the level of underpricing may substantially reect the risk of the uncertain liquidity
level. Ellul and Pagano (2006) provide a model showing that higher underpricing
levels are always associated with greater than expected illiquidity or a high liquidity
risk from the perspective of adverse selection. Using a data sample from the London
Stock Exchange (LSE) between June 1998 and December 2002, they employed high
frequency data to identify the directions of trading in the after-market of IPO. The
empirical test indicates that the relationship between the underpricing level and the
after-market liquidity level and the liquidity risk is robust. Moreover, it shows that
the secondary market liquidity does affect the cost of the equity capital for companies
when going public. Figure 1.6 illustrates the empirical result of average adverse
selection in the year after IPO.15
Further to the relationship between after-market liquidity and the underpricing
puzzle, Zheng and Li's (2007) ndings support the hypothesis that underpricing is
signicantly related to the secondary market liquidity. In their research, the regres-
sion is performed using the sample of 1179 IPOs in NASDAQmarket, and the authors
control the variables of ownership structure and other factors in the regression.
15 Reprint from Ellul and Pagano (2006), Figure 2.
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Figure 1.6: Average adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread and its range
of variation in the year after IPO
1.4.5 Litigation risk
The litigation risk is generally considered when signaling theory and information
asymmetry theory are applied to the underpricing puzzle. (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975;
Brown et al., 1988; Hughes and Thakor, 1992; Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter, 1994;
Beatty and Welch; 1996, Lowry and Shu, 2002).
Ibboston and Jaffe (1975), Brown et al. (1988) describe the underpricing as
a form of insurance against future liability, the price of the insurance being deter-
mined by the potential damage that a lawsuit would cause and the possibility of a
lawsuit happening. The level of underpricing increases as the damage and possibility
increase. Lowry and Shu (2002) continue to investigate the legal problem with two
specic hypotheses. First, rms with a higher litigation risk also have a higher level
of underpricing. The underpricing thus can be treated as a form of insurance for the
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investors. Second, a higher underpricing level leads to a lower expectation of litiga-
tion costs. The results of the analysis support the authors' hypothesis. If this is true,
the underpricing is in some sense a preestablished compensation for the litigation
risk and insurance against potential damages.
With the same question in mind, Dunbar et al. (1995) nd that available assets
are a better predictor of settlements than is potential damage. These ndings suggest
that companies going public are susceptible to frivolous lawsuits, which are essen-
tially difcult to avoid despite due diligence prior to the IPO. Therefore, the authors
conjecture that companies might resort to using underpricing as a form of insurance,
thus decreasing potential damages and lowering the probability of a lawsuit.
Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) focus on cross-sectional analysis of legal issues
in the offerings. They compared 93 IPO rms which were sued with a sample of
non-sued IPO rms, matched in respect of the year, underwriter rank, and offer size.
The authors conclude that the average initial returns of the sued rms were greater
than those of non-sued IPO rms. Further, the authors compare IPOs with positive
initial returns to those with initial returns less than, or equal to, zero, and nd that a
greater portion of IPOs in the rst category is sued. The empirical results imply that
sued rms are not systematically overpriced, and the results are inconsistent with the
litigation-risk hypothesis. Yet, critics argue that the analysis might be awed as it
suffers from an endogenous problem.
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Keloharju (1993) examines the underpricing of IPOs in Finland, where there is
negligible litigation risk. Evidence suggests a mean initial return of 8.7%, despite es-
sentially zero potential legal liabilities associated with the IPO. This nding suggests
that expected litigation costs cannot explain all of the initial returns. Yet it provides
little additional information on the legal risk in other markets, given that the legal
environments for IPO are substantially different. As Keloharju mentions, mean ini-
tial returns are signicantly higher in the U.S. market, which is possibly the result of
different litigation risks there.
Some specic studies have been performed in respect of different areas and
some specic laws. Beatty and Welch (1996) investigates the legal liability under the
Securities Act of 1933 (the U.S.), which requires issuers who seek to offer shares to
the public to register with the Security and Exchange Committee (SEC). Section 11
of the Securities Act of 1933 species that all the relevant parties in the offering, in-
cluding auditors, underwriters, issuers, persons signing the registration statement and
other experts, are jointly liable for damages caused by fake or misleading informa-
tion in the IPO registration statement. A judgement that an expert has violated the
relevant law means the expert is exposed to the entire damages award for the rele-
vant parties. Thus, the experts are linked to each other with respect to legal liabilities
and it is reasonable to require compensation for the legal risk. As Section 11 requires
"reasonable investigation", Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 requires "reason-
able care". In Section 12, issuers are required to refund the securities at the price of
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purchase if damages have been awarded. The authors implement a unique perspec-
tive in the sense that they show that all participating lawyers in initial public offerings
have to disclose their compensation. They nd that in the 1990s, high-quality lawyers
were better paid, while their peers in the 1970s and 1980s had been paid only about
as much as low-quality lawyers were paid. Further, high-quality lawyers can reduce
IPO underpricing and underwriters' compensation for smaller issuers. Finally, they
nd that unusually high payments to underwriters are oddly related yo an unusually
low number of risks described in the IPO prospectus and higher underpricing level on
average. The implication of this nding is that although the offering risk might not
usually be associated with the underpricing level, it could be a signicant inuence
in some extreme cases.
Jones and Weingram (1996) investigate the determinants of securities lawsuits
led under Section 10(b) from the perspective of law in the U.S.. They nd that
variables that enter into shareholder damage formulas, including the proportion of
shares traded, rm market capitalisation, and the share price declines, all contribute
to litigation exposure.
Alexander (1991) examines 17 computer-related IPOs in 1983 and discovers
that securities lawsuits are more likely led when the value of the ex post stock price
decline was sufcient to support the xed cost of bringing a case. The research fur-
ther indicates that apparently the ratio of shareholder losses to settlements of lawsuits
varies little from time to time.
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Sceptics, however, have been questioning the legal problem as an inuential
factor in the underpricing of IPO shares ever since this issue was mentioned in the
rst place. As discussed by Alexander (1993), the reason for ignoring the litigation
risk is that the cost of underpricing is huge relative to the average costs of lawsuit
settlements and the possibility of a lawsuit. Yet in the existing literature we have
reviewed, scepticism is not a mainstream argument.
1.4.6 Theories and the practice
It seems that academic studies have been thorough regarding the underpricing issue.
The empirical investigations focus on the stock return, the investors' subscription and
the market liquidity, and the theoretical studies focus on the information asymmetry,
investors' sentiment, shareholders' arrangements and so on. However, most relevant
research neglects the stand of the participants in the IPO practice and their judgement
of the academic theories.
Fortunately, Brau and Fawcett (2006) present a unique survey of the chief nan-
cial ofcers' (CFOs) opinions of the IPO related theories and provide a link between
theories and practice. The survey focuses upon seven IPO-related issues: motivation
for going public, time of offering, underwriter selection, underpricing signaling, the
offering process and the decision to stay private. The sample of rms is unbiased in
respect of the selection of rms. In the sample, there are listed rms that have com-
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pleted IPO, rms that are on the way of IPO and some rms that remain private but
are capable of going public.
The survey reveals some interesting features of IPO-related issues. First, the
results illustrate that CFOs believe the most important motivation for going public is
to create public shares for acquisitions, while the major theoretical explanations, such
as lowering the nancing cost and the pecking order of nancing, are of relatively
minor importance. Second, CFOs choose the time of going public by considering the
market and the industry stock returns, while the strength of the IPO market is less
inuential to the decision. Third, CFOs choose underwriters based on their overall
reputation, quality of their research department, and industrial expertise. Fourth,
CFOs view the historical earnings as the most positive signal and the top investment
banker as the second strongest positive signal. Fifth, CFOs prefer rm-commitment
underwriting contracts to other contracts, such as a best effort contract. Last, most of
the decisions to remain private are made to maintain the controlling position of the
rm.
Further to the underpricing puzzle, the survey focuses on two issues: expec-
tations and explanations. The result indicates that CFOs are well informed on un-
derpricing, the expected underpricing level of CFOs being on average 10.0% and the
actual mean underpricing level is 13.5%. Among the many explanations of underpric-
ing, CFOs value the reason of compensating investors for taking the risk of the IPO
as the most important one, which is consistent with Beatty and Ritter's (1986) theory.
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Three other reasons valued highly by CFOs are favourable allocation to institutional
investors, achieving a broader ownership structure and increasing after-market liq-
uidity.
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Chapter 2
Analysis into IPO Underpricing and
Clustering
2.1 Introduction
IPO underpricing is a well documented fact in many empirical studies in nancial
markets all over the world. During the period from 1990 to 1998, more than $27 bil-
lion were left on the table in the U.S. by IPO underpricing (Loughran, Ritter, 2002).
Although great effort has been made to verify the existence of IPO underpricing and
other IPO-related puzzles, such as the long-term underperformance puzzle, it is sur-
prising that there is relatively few work on the degrees of IPO underpricing and the
reasons for the differences in the level of underpricing.
Meanwhile, clustering, another IPO related question, is less noticed. In a few
existing works related to IPO clustering (Hoffmann-Burchardi, 2001, Yung et al.,
2006, Alti, 2005), the underpricing of IPO shares is always claimed as the result of
clustering, regarding the information externality or investor sentiment. Yet the rela-
tionship between clustering and the level of underpricing has not yet been carefully
examined in empirical studies.
70
In this chapter, we aim to explore the determinants to the underpricing level
and the relationship between the level of IPO underpricing and the clustering. We
start by reviewing the relevant literature.
2.1.1 IPO underpricing
The asymmetric information story is a natural rst thought that an investigator would
have when it comes to explaining IPO-related phenomena. As the Akerlof's "Lemon
market", in a market for newly offered shares the public investors may know little
about the rm and its shares. The IPO rms may face a consistently pessimistic
public that on average tend to undervalue the shares. Through the offering, better
informed investors may take advantage of these pessimistic public by trading the
IPO shares. At the end, their inside information becomes public, appearing in the
trading price of the shares in secondary market.
The other interpretation of the information asymmetric theory is the avoidance
of the "winner's curse" (Rock, 1986). Usually, the best informed investors are not
the successful bidders. The best informed investors do not want to bid for shares
because the fair price according to their information is lower than the trading price.
As a result, the successful but uninformed bidders are cursed in the offering, paying
an extra amount of money for some the shares that are less valuable. The consequence
of the "winner's curse" is that the uninformed investors will only win when the shares
are not so valuable.
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Since the IPO rms are young on average and with relatively opaque informa-
tion, irrational investor story claims that the irrational investors might misperceive
the value of the information about the shares and the market momentum to invest.
Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2004) rst model the sentiment investors in IPO mar-
ket. Intuitively, those sentimental or irrational investors should die out in the nancial
markets and in the long run only rational investors could survive. However, existing
research (Yan, 2005) presents evidences that in a limited arbitrage world, the irra-
tional investors might be able to survive long enough to drive prices to an "unreason-
able" level for a considerable period (bubbles).
The agreement theory is based on the assumption that the issuer wants some
target investors. The underpricing is purposeful as it serves to attract more investors
and select the most desirable one. The intentions could be either to attract investors
who can aid in acquisitions that are being nanced by the IPO (Brennan and Franks,
1997), or to attract investors who are more likely to be favourably disposed to the
rm's business or methods of management (Stoughton and Zechner, 1997). In both
cases, the target investor selection will increase the value of the rm. Unlike the
information asymmetry and sentimental theories, this kind of underpricing theories
is because of articial arrangements and the degree of underpricing is controlled by
the issuers.
There are many other interpretations for the IPO puzzles, such as legal prob-
lems, price stabilisation strategy, and tax issues. However, none of them alone could
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explain the underpricing puzzle. Moreover, most of theoretical works which aim to
shed light to IPO's underpricing assume that the IPOs are independent in time so that
the level of underpricing should not show any pattern in time series. As we will see
it is not the case and the level of underpricing exhibits strong auto-correlation. After
all, the question is still remaining: Why are IPO shares underpriced?
2.1.2 IPO clustering
Traditionally the reason for IPO clustering has been always related with the industry
specic information or investor sentiment. Mauer and Senbet (1992) argue that the
price exhibited in secondary market of an IPO rms can reduce the uncertainty of the
following rms going public. Booth and Chua (1996) argue that the marginal cost of
information can be reduced for rms going public at the same time.
Along the line of the information spillover, Hoffmann-Burchardi (2001) fo-
cuses on the revelation of a common-value component in the process of price de-
termination, and lays emphasis on the importance of information externalities. The
price of the IPO shares of one rm from a particular industry serves as an indicator
of the common positive information about the followers in the same industry.
From the entrepreneurs' perspective, Hoffmann-Burchardi claims that a rm
with utility-maximising risk-averse characteristic will go public if and only if the
entrepreneur gains less from the risky cash ow from the rm than selling it to the
public risk-neutral investors. In his model where rms go public sequentially, one
73
after another, the value of the rm is decided by two factors: rm specic factor and
industry specic factor. There is asymmetric information between the entrepreneurs
and investors. The entrepreneur does not know much about industry specic factors,
while he may be better informed about the rm specic factor. On the other side
the investors in the market may posses more information about the industry specic
factor than the issuer. Once the issuer believes the market value is much greater than
he estimates, which indicate the market is hot, he will sell shares to the market. They
conclude that this story also explains why hot market often coincides with greater
underpricing. In the market where trading price is greater than that expected by
issuer the underpricing is more severe for sure.
Meanwhile, some researches show that time-varying adverse selection, the re-
sult of information asymmetry, plays a more important role in IPO clustering. Ben-
ninga, Helmantel, and Sarig (2005) argue that IPO clustering in a particular industry
is triggered by the rm with the highest cash ow in this industry going public, which
in turn produces the information of both the rm's value and the investment oppor-
tunities in this industry. The valuable information about the industry prospect being
perceived by both investors and private rms serves now as a focal point for another
agents and leads to clustering. The cluster dies out with the end of market opti-
mism. Additionally, Jain and Kini (2005) believe that lower information asymmetry
between issuers and investors together with an increase in investor optimism are also
important factors to trigger the IPO cluster. Meanwhile, they claim that the downside
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of the IPO clustering is because of the over-investment in one industry, which results
in a long term under performance.
Up to my knowledge, the closest research to the research in this chapter is
the one made by Lowry and Schwert (2002). They directly test the relation between
clustering and underpricing level. By examining the sample of IPOs during the period
from 1960 to 1997, they nd that the IPO volume and average underpricing are highly
auto-correlated, and that the greater number companies tend to go public after periods
of high IPO underpricing. They conclude that similar types of rms choose going
public at the same time. More importantly, the offering registration information has
an effect on the offering price and going public decisions. In their analysis they use
the average underpricing data for each month instead of the underpricing level of
each IPO share as we do. Also they do not differentiate between different industry
sectors except for high tech rms which are insufcient to justify any arguments
related to the industry specic factor. Their conclusion that "similar" rms choose
the same time of being public seems to be a premature one. Furthermore, failing
to control the inuence of initial selling volume on the initial return leaves us with
another unanswered question: Is the cluster just a gathering of rms or an increase
demand for capital?
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2.1.3 Structure of the chapter
In this chapter, we test the hypothesis using data sample from the Hong Kong equity
market. On one hand, overwhelming research has been done in mature nancial
market, such as United States and United Kingdom. However, the Hong Kong market
is seldom mentioned in the existing literature. It is reasonable to believe that by using
the data from Hong Kong market, the research could provide new data to extend the
existing research. On the other hand, it is arguably that the rules for nancial market
are incomplete and changing over time. Applying the data sample from emerging
market, such as India and Mainland China, the research may be less convincing when
we compare the result with the existing literature.
In this chapter, we examine the empirical data to answer the above posed ques-
tions. Also, it simulates a shock on the underpricing to demonstrate the relationship
between liquidity and underpricing level. The simulation result suggests that the
competition among IPO shares and the effect of liquidity shock is determined by
some exogenous parameters, but not by the shocks per se. Furthermore, this research
focuses on the liquidity shock, and also demonstrates that the clustering is neither the
reason for nor the result of the severe underpricing. The reasons for the clustering
may vary, and further investigation is needed but beyond this research.
The research is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe the data set.
Section 2.3 shows the result of the empirical analysis. In section 2.4 we discusses
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results and simulates a shock to demonstrate their robustness. We propose a type of
option to hedge the liquidity risk in Section 2.5 and then conclude in Section 2.6.
2.2 Data
The data used in this chapter is from Investment Service Centre of the Hong Kong
Exchange and Clearing Limited for initial public offerings from the November, 1999
to the end of 2005. The offer price, number of shares offered and the date of the
rst trading day of the IPO shares are collected from their prospectus in Hong Kong
Exchange's public document database. First day open price and trading volume are
collected from both Datastream Advanced(DA) and Yahoo! Finance 16, since some
trading prices are missing from either DA or Yahoo! database. A few trading infor-
mation are still missing from both of them. The information about the industry sector
categorisation is also collected from Datastream Advanced. Except for internet bub-
ble, none other signicant bubble was recorded in Hong Kong market and worldwide
as well during this period. Internet bubble is signicantly inuential in U.S. nan-
cial market, but much more moderate in Hong Kong. By considering other industries
were not signicantly inuenced by the internet bubble and the availability of the
data, the data from year of 1999, 2000 and 2001 is included.
The IPO prospectus before November 1999 is not available on the Hong Kong
exchange web page. The IPOs after 2005 are not included in this research because
16 Yahoo! Finance, Hong Kong, http://hk.nance.yahoo.com.
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of blooming of IPOs in both China Mainland and Hong Kong since the beginning of
2006.
The interest rate is used as the risk free rate in this research. The information
of interest rate are separately collected from The People's Bank of China (PBC),
China's central bank, for one year xed rate for Yuan (RMB) and Hong Kong Census
and Statistic Department for Hong Kong dollar's "best lending rate". Here we do not
take the exchange rates as a risk factor, since the exchange rate is almost xed for
both currencies. RMB kept its exchange rate to US dollar at the level of 8.27 during
the period and Hong Kong dollar was kept at the level between 7.758 and 7.799.
The underpricing level (UPi) is dened as the ratio of the difference between
rst day open price (OPENi) and offering price (OFFERi). The market initial
selling (CAPi) is dened as the product between the shares offered (N_SHAREi)
and the open price (OPENi).
UPi =
OPENi  OFFERi
OFFERi
(2.1)
CAPi = N_SHAREi OPENi (2.2)
In this research we use log market capitalisation based on e (LN_CAPi) to
represent market capitalisation. The number of IPOs (Nt), total initial selling volume
(LN(CAPt)) in every month are used to describe the trend of the IPO market. There
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Panel A: Basic Information
Min Max Mean Std Dev N
UP -0.96 21.00 0.35 1.94 454
LN(CAP) 12.90 24.85 18.84 1.70 455
OFFER 0.10 84.00 1.78 4.46 490
VLM 14378 3637142272 109492411.9 251435461.2 455
N_SHARE 4002005 26485944000 423497776.4 1761543296 490
Panel B: Number of IPOs
Time Window Total No. of IPOs Avg No. of IPOs per
Month
Std Var of No. of IPOs
per Month
1999 Nov to 1999 End 15 7.00 0.50
Year 2000 85 7.08 13.36
Year 2001 88 7.33 17.88
Year 2002 108 9.00 13.45
Year 2003 64 5.33 8.97
Year 2004 66 5.50 12.09
Year 2005 64 5.33 20.79
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics for the IPO sample
are 34 industry sectors(INDSECTi) with 440 rms in total, plus "unclassied sec-
tor" which consists of 50 rms.
Table 2.1 provides the descriptive information about the variables used in this
research. In the sample period, the average underpricing level is 34.9%. In only one
extreme case with stock code 8036, "36.com Holding Limited", the underpricing is
399.0, which is excluded from the descriptive statistics. Some of the data are not
available, so the number of data is not the same for different variables as it is shown
in Table 2.1.
The statistic information about the underpricing level and capitalisation in dif-
ferent industries are listed in Table 2.2. By the sector information provided in Datas-
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tream, the IPO rms are distributed among 34 industries. The "Unclassied cases"
refers to the rms without sector information in Datastream.
Among all classied industries, the mean of underpricing level for a particular
industry is minimal for the industry labeled by "Oil and Gas Producers" and maximal
for "Travel & Leisure". The greatest averaged underpricing level is in unclassied
group. Only one rm is in the "Mobile Telecommunications" industry and it has the
greatest average market capitalisation, while the "Chemicals" industry has the lowest
average capitalisation. "Personal Goods" is the largest industry group in our sample,
except the "Unclassied Cases" group. The numbers of samples vary across different
industries.
2.3 Empirical Findings
2.3.1 Underpricing auto-correlation and capitalisation impact
Since the trading price is immediately effective in the secondary market, the issuer
will always suffer a loss from selling its shares at price lower than the market price
with the discount rate equal to the underpricing level. Thus the underpricing level
is also regarded as the measure for the cost of capital for the issuers. If the issuer
hopes to sell their shares successfully, the underpricing level must be competitive.
Examining the aggregated underpricing data series by unit root assumption (Phillips-
Perron test), I nd that the stochastic trend exists in the time series of data and this
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N
Min Max Mean StdDev Min Max Mean Std Dev Valid Cases
Electronic, Electrical Equip. -0.55 0.98 0.03 0.30 146.42 1,456.00 228.00 361.25 17
General Retailers -0.79 0.28 -0.07 0.37 12.80 1,920.96 456.75 702.81 9
Leisure Goods -0.03 0.26 0.05 0.09 7.35 1,320.00 397.97 509.57 7
Household Goods -0.66 4.71 0.33 1.20 27.00 1,952.70 236.96 491.38 16
Mobile Telecommunications 0.10 0.10 0.10 N.A. 43,895.41 43,895.41 43,895.41 N.A. 1
Software & Computer Services -0.90 19.59 1.04 3.48 4.48 5,100.00 394.28 905.03 34
General Industrials -0.20 0.04 -0.02 0.11 51.00 196.00 103.33 64.89 4
Personal Goods -0.07 0.32 0.06 0.08 21.06 2,272.91 235.30 418.93 37
Technology Hardware & Equip. -0.10 4.81 0.24 0.85 27.97 12,466.67 720.79 2,241.45 24
General Financial -0.71 0.90 0.09 0.38 20.30 315.00 85.66 80.42 11
Real Estate -0.12 0.55 0.13 0.23 0.00 3,820.28 845.78 1,340.05 7
Travel & Leisure -0.04 9.65 2.47 3.82 51.50 18,400.00 4,655.07 7,573.99 6
Industrial Metals -0.20 0.27 0.00 0.20 44.00 3,928.94 1,666.49 1,861.13 4
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology -0.02 1.14 0.22 0.33 0.00 2,875.40 285.68 657.71 15
Construction & Materials -0.69 0.42 0.02 0.22 15.50 600.60 135.92 178.72 14
Industrial Transportation -0.09 0.10 0.01 0.05 22.00 7,671.40 1,947.08 2,428.96 10
Oil Equipment & Services 0.04 0.88 0.27 0.35 57.60 2,402.37 578.45 1,020.66 4
Food & Drug Retailers 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.02 65.75 607.50 290.52 282.40 3
Support Services -0.05 3.26 0.32 0.89 39.37 5,120.00 501.92 1,390.44 11
Healthcare Equipment, Services 0.02 1.00 0.33 0.41 74.88 209.30 125.93 52.16 5
Industrial Engineering 0.00 0.65 0.12 0.20 50.40 5,083.68 765.42 1,440.85 13
Automobiles & Parts 0.00 0.37 0.12 0.14 41.86 4,047.70 1,020.93 1,418.04 8
Banks 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.05 2,302.30 62,241.97 21,992.48 24,660.02 5
Media -0.08 0.51 0.11 0.14 13.67 4,500.00 376.59 887.97 22
Chemicals -0.94 9.00 1.08 3.52 3.00 103.54 46.50 33.15 5
Food Producers -0.14 0.41 0.10 0.13 52.20 1,685.17 467.64 547.18 13
Equity Investment Instruments -0.96 0.52 -0.17 0.45 0.40 326.35 73.91 105.36 11
Mining 0.01 0.42 0.22 0.30 163.70 23,129.42 11,646.56 16,239.22 2
Forestry & Paper 0.27 0.27 0.27 N.A. 151.20 151.20 151.20 N.A. 1
Beverages -0.78 0.30 -0.19 0.54 31.54 876.00 378.90 441.69 3
Nonlife Insurance 0.34 0.40 0.37 0.04 594.42 7,272.58 3,933.50 4,722.18 2
Life Insurance 0.02 0.27 0.14 0.18 14,572.87 29,441.18 22,007.02 10,513.48 2
Fixed Line Telecommunications -0.01 0.13 0.06 0.06 23.26 10,503.40 4,160.63 5,490.69 4
Electricity 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.05 2,760.00 2,851.20 2,805.60 64.49 2
Oil & Gas Producers -0.65 0.06 -0.19 0.40 10,864.65 28,191.22 20,520.45 8,832.20 2
Unclassified Cases -0.79 399.00 6.30 47.39 12.10 40,320.00 889.26 4,802.35 59
UP
Industry Sectors
          CAP(million HKD)
Table 2.2: Statistical information of IPOs across industry sectors
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trend should be removed from the underpricing series. Instead of the variable UPi,
this research uses the difference in two nearest underpricing level (diff(UP )i) as the
dependent variable. The same unit root test has been performed on this data set and
no signicant trend is found. Moreover, the initial selling (CAPi) of the IPO per se
will also inuence the underpricing level when the liquidity in the market is limited.
First we perform the regression test on the following equation.
diffi =
JX
j=1
kjdiffi j + k0 ln(CAPi) + pihk + c+ "i: (2.3)
The test results for various choices of J are shown in Panel A of Table 2.3.
The results suggest that when J = 7 the regression becomes signicant. At that
time the CAPi signicantly inuences the difference in the underpricing level. The
dummy variables Y 99, Y 00, Y 01, Y 02, Y 03, Y 04, and Y 05 are used to represent
the market wide factors in different years. For example, if the IPO takes place in the
year 1999, Y 99 is 1. Otherwise, the variable Y 99 equals to 0. As shown in Table
2.3, none of the year dummy variable is signicantly inuential to the regression.
The insignicant result suggests that during the sample period, there is no temporary
shock in the nancial market.
It is interesting that the initial selling positively inuences the difference of
underpricing level, but not the underpricing itself (the last is conrmed by performing
corresponding test). Supposing that the capitalisation is constant and equal to its
average level, we could expect that diffi will be zero. So the average underpricing
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in period i will remain the same as the previous one. This result suggests that if the
selling of IPO shares is continuous without huge jumps the underpricing will remain
at the same level. The R square in this testing is 0.44 in this regression, suggesting
the liquidity shock caused by the initial selling and the auto-regression part explain
considerable part of the change of underpricing. Other factors, such as risk free rates
(the Hong Kong interest rate ihk and the Mainland China interest rate icn, are not
signicant in this regression.
Time should be another factor in measuring market liquidity. Dene as the
time distance between IPO i and i-1. Another regression test is done on the following
equation:
diffi =
JX
j=1
kjdiffi je ti j + k0 ln(CAPi) + c+ "i (2.4)
Yet the regression is not signicant, and cannot rule out the hypothesis that all
kj are statistically zero. This result suggests that the liquidity shock does not exist
on time scale, but on the scale of sequential IPOs. This result is interesting. If the
large scale initial selling is regarded as the liquidity shock on the market, issues of
liquidity should rather be considered on the scale of IPOs' sequences than on the
natural calendar time scale. The additional argument could be that investors prefer
IPOs shares over common ones which are available at any point of time.
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Insignicant inuence of interest rate and none existence of time factor in un-
derpricing auto-regression together imply that the liquidity here is not the usual mar-
ket liquidity, but rather the capital liquidity for IPO shares.
Traditionally industry cycles and industry specic risk have been used to ex-
plain the underpricing and clustering. A similar analysis has been performed within
different industry sectors to verify the inuence of liquidity shocks. The result of
this testing is shown in Panel B of Table 2.3. Since the analysis is limited by the
number of samples available in different industry sectors, only four industry sectors
with signicant number of rms are available for performing such regression: "Elec-
tronic, Electronic Equip.", "Software & Computer Services", "Personal Goods" and
"Media".
No signicant relationship is shown among ln(CAPi) and diffi variables in
any of these sectors as we found earlier. This again veries the nding that the
change in underpricing is not caused by the business cycles in different industries,
change of risk factors, or investors' optimistic or pessimistic views about different
industries, but due to the liquidity shocks. Basically, the IPO shares are chasing the
capital by changing the underpricing level, regardless of their industry sectors.
Based on the negative coefcients in the auto regression, I found that the un-
derpricing level trends to be stable except when great liquidity shock comes. Since
the calendar time is not involved in this regression, the result does not imply that the
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Table 2.3: Underpricing autocorrelation test and the capitalisation impact.
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Table 2.4: Autoregression of IPO capitalisation
underpricing will be clustering in time. But the clustering will happen when the IPOs
come more frequently with greater initial selling.
2.3.2 Clustering of capitalisation, number of IPOs
Since the severe underpricing level is caused by liquidity shock, the initial selling
waves (peaks) are crucial to understand the changes in underpricing.
The clustering can be discovered in the frequencies of IPOs and the average
initial selling in a longer period. With time window of one month, the number of
IPOs (Nt) is used to represent the frequency and total initial selling (TCAPt) of each
month and thus get the average initial selling of IPO shares (ACAPt). The number
of IPOs in every month is illustrated in Figure 2.1, and the average initial selling in
every month is presented in Figure 2.2.
The autoregression results show that only previous 5 periods have signicantly
inuence on the initial selling now, whereas the autoregression result of underpricing
87
shows that previous 7 periods matters. This difference in time series indicates that
the underpricing have different cycles from initial selling.
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Figure 2.1: Number of IPOs over time in Hong Kong market from November 1999
to December 2005
A Spearman correlation test among frequencies, average underpricing and ag-
gregated initial selling is crucial to nd out the relation between clustering and un-
derpricing. The result of the correlation test is shown in Table 2.5. This result shows
that the clustering measured by the number of IPOs, N , is not correlated with the av-
erage underpricing level, AUP . The average initial selling of IPO shares of every
month, LnACAP , is not correlated with average underpricing of that month, either.
This evidence is contrary to the predictions of many theoretical papers which
claim the severe underpricing is either the result of a bubble, or the reason of a bubble.
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Figure 2.2: Average IPO capitalisation in Hong Kong market from November 1999
to December 2005 (monthly).
N ln(ACAP) AUP
N Spearman's rho 1.000 -0.991** 0.249
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.306
N 74 74 74
ln(ACAP) Spearman's rho -0.991** 1.000 -0.208
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.075
N 74 74 74
AUP Spearman's rho 0.249 -0.208 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.306 0.075
N 74 74 74
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 2.5: Correlation test on the relationship between clustering and underpricing
level.
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In some cases, more severe underpricing is observed in the period of IPO clus-
tering and seemingly they are related. Especially in 1999, during the "dot-com bub-
ble", the average underpricing was 69%. However, the relationship between these
two variables is not statistically signicant in our sample. And thus it is reasonable
to believe that a severe underpricing is not a necessary consequence of clustering.
2.3.3 Remarks
Based on the regression result of underpricing, I simulate the time series process by
injecting a shock of initial selling volume, which is much greater than normal initial
selling volume. The result is shown in Figure 2.3. The following equations are used
for this simulation:
upi = upi 1 + diffi (2.5)
diffi =
7X
j=1
kjdiffi j + "i (2.6)
Here we use the value of kj in Panel A (Table 2.3) and injected one liquidity
shock of the size -1017 at the step i = 500. There are in total 1000 steps (periods) in
the simulation, and we take "i = N(0; 1). To keep things simple, here we initialise
the rst 7 period upi by the the rst 7 realisations of "i and eliminate the constant in
17 The particular size of the shock does not change essentially transition path represented in Figure
2.4.
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the rst order difference equation (2.3), by assuming that the majority of IPO initial
selling are at the average level.
The dotted line in Figure 2.3 is the simulated underpricing level without shock,
and the continuous line is with shock. The enlarged shock effect can be seen in Figure
2.4. The rst impression is that the shock causes volatility of underpricing level to
increase, and also moves the underpricing out of its equilibrium level.
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Figure 2.3: Simulation of shocks in IPO underpricing.
It is noteworthy that the volatility effect of the shock in this simulation will be
lasting for 21 periods after the shock until the volatility reduced to less than 1% of
the shock, and the length of the period is solely decided by the kj , neither change
after the variance of "i, nor the size of the shock. The percentage of change as the
consequence of the shock remains the same when the variance of "i is changed to
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Figure 2.4: Shock effect over time in IPO underpricing level.
100, or the shock is changed to 1 and 600. The underpricing level changed by the
shock related with the size of the shock, but the ratio of the changed level over the
size of the shock depends solely on kj .
The kj and constant in the regression should be varying and intrinsic in different
market. Ritter18 records average initial returns (underpricing level) in 39 countries
and areas. Figure 2.5 shows the 5 countries with highest average initial return and
5 countries with lowest average initial return. Although the time period varies in
the average initial return date in different countries, the difference between the two
groups is clearly shown. The average underpricing level in the 5 lowest countries
are 8.40%, while 121.84% in the 5 highest countries. Those countries with highest
18 Jay Ritter, IPO Data, http://bear.cba.u.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm, 2007.
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underpricing level are usually those with immature nancial market and strict capital
control. This implies that there is limited capital liquidity and the investors have
limited ability to arbitrage because of capital control in the emerging markets.
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Figure 2.5: The average underpricing level across countries.
2.4 IPO Option
2.4.1 Option design
The main nding of this research is that the IPO underpricing level is subject to the
market liquidity, in other words, the extend of the distress of the funding. In practice,
the investment banks are trying to predict the level of the market liquidity, time series
properties of the underpricing level is cyclical. Since the investment banks in mature
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market have better knowledge of the market and can predict the market liquidity more
accurately, the average underpricing in different countries varies. However, since the
prediction of the market reacts could not be accurate, the issuer, underwriter and
primary market investors are still exposed to the liquidity risk in the offering process.
An option linking IPO shares in rst trading day in secondary market is needed to
offset the risk.
The option could be designed as follows. Assume that company Q is going
public, and the offer price in primary market is P1 while trading price in secondary
market on the rst day open is P2. We can set the target of the IPO put options X at
P2 and allow the trading of the options before the trading of the shares in secondary
market.
T1 T2 T3 T4
Short-selling
prohibited
Offer price
settled
Publicly trading
starts
Options traded
Expire day of
the IPO option
Roadshow and
bookbuilding
Figure 2.6: The design for the option of IPO shares.
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This option arrangement will help in two ways. First, it will help investors to
hedge their risk when buying the stocks in the primary market, while having rela-
tively insufcient knowledge about the stock they hold. As a result, with the IPO put
optionX they can lock-up their prot by bearing this knowing-nothing risk. Second,
the option arrangement will help issuer and underwriter to stabilise the price in the
rst few days in the secondary market and encourage investing in primary market.
Consequently, the risk underlying in IPO shares in primary market will be largely re-
duced and the offer price in primary market could be at a reasonable higher level.
Consequently, the underpricing level can be reduced.
For now, it seems to be a big problem for issuers and underwriters to stabilising
the secondary market if they are not sure of that. Always they have to withdraw the
IPO registrations after the rst round investigation of the market condition when the
market condition is not clear to them. Here is an example.
"Genutec Business Solutions Inc. led with U.S. securities regulators to with-
draw its registration statement for an initial public offering, citing market conditions.
No securities of the company were sold in connection with the offering, Genutec said
in a regulatory ling. The company had earlier led for an IPO of up to $25 million
of shares. "19
In fact, there are many IPO withdrawals in the business practice. According
to the interview with Sam Snyder, senior analyst of IPOHome.com, by Associated
19 Reuters, Aug 29th, 2007.
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Press, as of Aug. 31, 2007, 25 companies have withdrawn their IPOs in the year and
27 companies as of this time in 2006. At the meantime, there have been 150 IPOs in
2007 and 105 IPOs in 2006. The withdraw ratio of IPOs is 16.6% and 25.7% in 2007
and 2006. With the IPO option, it's reasonable to believe that the withdraw ratio can
be remarkably reduced.20
It is noteworthy that the underpricing will eventually turn into the cost of equity
nancing for the rm. If we think about the rms which can not afford the cost of
going public, the reduction of this cost will therefore lead to more rm going public,
and increase the efciency of the market.
This arrangement also optimises the IPO mechanism. There is some argument
about the mechanism of IPOs. In the old times, auction is the way underwriters
selling IPO shares, while now in most of the cases bookbuilding method is the way
of selling IPO shares. It reserves the advantage of auction method, which have a
more accurate price and won't result in signicant underpricing. Meanwhile, the
basic form of the IPO selling is still bookbuilding system.
2.4.2 Alternative choices
Implementing IPO options in bookbuilding system is not the only way. Actually,
there is some alternatives to function as the IPO options, such as the "when-issued"
market in German market. Aussenegg, Pichler and Stomper (2003) investigate this
market and discuss the advantage of the "when-issued" market and functions of the
20 http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2007/08/31/ap4073857.html
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bookbuilding in the existence of the "when-issued" market. The "when-issued" mar-
ket is the mechanism that investor can buy and sell securities in advance of the actual
offering in a pre-auction. This kind of security marketing mechanism has been used
in practise. In the U.S. Treasury Securities market, the investors can buy and sell se-
curities and the pre-auction also reveals the market demand of the certain securities.
However, "when-issued" market is seldom seen in most of the IPO market in
the world. In the U.S., for example, such trading activities are strictly prohibited by
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent the covering of short sales.
By Regulation M, Rule 105, the covering of short selling activities within the short
period within the ve business days before pricing or during the period beginning
with the ling of the registration statement and ending with the pricing. And the
reason for this is stated in "The Securities Exchange Act Release No. 38067 on
Regulation M".21
Rule 105 is intended to prevent manipulative short selling prior to a public
offering by short sellers who cover their short positions by purchasing securities in
the offering, thus largely avoiding exposure to market risk. Such short sales could
result in a lower offering price and reduce an issuer's proceeds."
In a detailed summary of this act by Goodwin Procter LLP22 on December
13th, 2006, it is shown that the SEC began expressing their concern on short selling
21 SEC Rules, http://www.sec.gov/rules/nal/34-38067.txt
22 Goodwin Procter LLP, http://www.goodwinprocter.com/
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before offering since 1972. In 1987, the SEC rst proposed Rule 10b-21, and this
was nally replaced by Rule 105 of Regulation M in 1996.
In this circumstance, the IPO option is left to be the only choice for hedging
the risk of IPO shares. More importantly, the legal environment in many mature
markets, such as the U.K. and Hong Kong, are almost the same as the U.S. This
option is traded out of the prohibited period, since the trading period is between the
end of pricing of the offering shares in bookbuiliding process and the start of trading
in secondary market. Up till now, it is the very few nancial products that can help
to hedge the risk within a legal framework.
2.5 Concluding Discussion
This chapter investigates the IPO underpricing from the perspective of integrated pri-
mary and secondary market, and documents that the IPO underpricing is determined
by the previous IPOs' underpricing level for the rst time. It implies that there is a
competition among IPO shares. Note that other outstanding stocks are excluded from
this competition.
By analysing the distinctive feature of IPO cases in Hong Kong from Novem-
ber in 1999 to the end of 2005, this chapter documents the fact that apart from un-
derpricing, there was signicant clustering of IPOs over time. Moreover, the level of
underpricing is closely related to the underpricing level of previous IPOs. This nd-
ing suggests that the underpricing is strategically arranged by underwriter's syndicate
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to favour the investors. This investigation also reveals that the initial selling volume
of IPOs is strongly auto-correlated. Together with IPOs' clustering, evidences also
suggest that the issuers tend to choose the specic time to go public, and an increase
in initial selling volume leads to more severe underpricing. It could be interpreted
as the compensation for the liquidity shock caused by supplying a huge amount of
shares in the market.
This underpricing competition implies the specic characteristic of IPO shares
per se, which could be interpreted as a specic risk premium. This characteristic
might also help us to understand the reason for IPO underpricing within the frame-
work of rational investor paradigm in the future research.
The predictability of IPO underpricing by previous IPO underpricing clearly
should not be the result of investors' sentiment, but rather a reection of the risk,
such as coordination problem in IPO and the compensation of the liquidity shock.
The coordination risk comes from the asymmetric information, because IPO per se
is a process of information creating, "information cascade" (Welch, 1992). The "in-
formation cascades" story claims that investors make their investment decisions se-
quentially. Successful initial sales encourage following investors to revise their own
information about the share and to invest, and unsuccessful initial sales discourage
the investors. IPO underpricing competition prevents public from continuous pes-
simism. Further investigations are needed to discover the nature of the risk associated
with IPO shares within the framework of efcient market hypothesis (EMH).
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This liquidity shock and IPOs' competition can also explain the severe under-
pricing during the internet bubble period around 1999. Documented by Ljungqvist
and Wilhelm (2003), the IPO underpricing is 69% in the year of 1999 on average and
56% in 2000, whereas the underpricing in 1996 is only 17% on average. The ini-
tial selling of the IPOs is on average $65.3 million and $124.1 million in 1999 and
2000, signicantly greater than the previous years. In 1996, 1997, 1998, the initial
selling of IPO shares are $35.3 million, $32.6 million and $51.3 million. From the
perspective of liquidity, this is exactly the result of the liquidity shock of IPO shares.
Interestingly, the inuence of previous IPOs underpricing level on the following one
is not subject to the time interval between IPOs. In the regression, the underpric-
ing level is not signicantly related to the previous one when the time is added as a
factor.
The investigation among different industries reveals that the IPO underpric-
ing auto-correlation is not statistically signicant at the industry level. Clearly the
changes in IPO underpricing levels are not related with industry specic factors (spe-
cic risks), but the market factors (market risk), such as market liquidity. The analysis
on the initial selling reveals that in the short run, initial selling volume is inuenced
by the previous IPO initial selling volumes. This fact indicates that despite the spe-
cic industry cycle, issue choose the time to go public mainly relying on information
related to a few previous IPOs.
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At the end of this research, we propose that an option of IPO shares can be
helpful for the players in the IPO business in practice, regarding the reduction of
liquidity risks in the offering. In addition, the option can also optimise the IPO
mechanism within the bookbuilding framework.
The evidences presented in this chapter suggest that the IPO underpricing is
predictable and the liquidity shocks caused by IPO shares at least partially explain
the level of underpricing. Further promising investigation regarding the liquidity
risks should focus on the specic risk factors associated with IPO shares.
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Chapter 3
The Nature of Underwriter Network in
IPOs: A Layered Structure
3.1 Introduction
It is a question worthy of note but rarely mentioned, that based upon which principles,
a leading underwriter select the members for and construct the IPO syndicate. The
fundamental question here is: why not undertake the underwriting business alone? In
particular, when the commission fee for the underwriting service is proportional to
the size of the IPO, it is innate that investment bankers should close the door to their
competitors once the appointment of the leading underwriter has been made. Every
time a new investment bank becomes involved in the one IPO, the cake of the under-
writing business has to be split into more and smaller pieces. If this is true, the lead
underwriter has no incentive to bring in other underwriters/members into the syndi-
cate unless the latter can be helpful. Then, the question remains: what distinctive
talent does the new member underwriter have such that the lead underwriter needs to
pay for it?
Most of the relevant research focuses on the following areas. Having roots in
behavioural nance theory, some researchers attempt to explain how underwriters
manipulate their afliated analysts' reports (McNichols and O'Brien, 1997; Irvine,
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2003; Cliff and Denis, 2004) to inuence investor's sentiment. Some other theories
(Carter and Manaster, 1990; Rock, 1986) focus on the issue that the underwriters'
reputation may possibly affect aspects of the IPO performance, such as the under-
pricing level and the aftermarket liquidity. Other theories explain how the under-
writers use their networks and resources to win or secure their future underwriting
appointments (Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm, 2007). However, surprisingly little
work has been done to answer the questions as to how the underwriter's syndicate is
constructed, and why some underwriters recruit others but not all.
The primary aim of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence to identify the
underlying mechanism in the construction of underwriter syndicates. It is intended to
institute key indexes for syndicates and hence investigate their relationships with IPO
performance. In exploring the nature of the underwriter network, using the cutting-
edge methods of random network theory and simulation, this chapter shows that the
underwriters de facto are connected with each other within two sub-groups. Nor-
mally underwriters do business with their peers who are in the same sub-groups.
Empirical evidence suggests that the underwriting service that is provided by the two
sub-groups of underwriters leads to different outcomes, and this nding has substan-
tial practical implications for the investment banking business.
The following section reviews the literature. In Section 3.3, we describe the
data. Section 3.4 presents the measures and the overview of the underwriting syndi-
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cates. A comparison and analysis of the two sub-groups of underwriters are presented
in Section 3.5 while Section 3.6 is the conclusion.
3.2 Literature Review
Normally syndicates rather than single underwriters serve IPOs nowadays in prac-
tice; yet the joint or syndicating form of the underwriting business has not always
been in the dominant position. As documented by Ljungqvist et al. (2007), un-
derwriting syndicates gained their dominant position around 1990 as the increase in
issuers' capital demand exceeded the capability of individual underwriters. Within
the syndicate, underwriters share the risk inherent in the process of fund-raising as
well as sharing the revenue earned for providing underwriting services.
The rst remarkable joint underwriting case was in 1906. At that time, as
recorded by Carosso (1970), Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers began to build
their long term exclusive comanagement relationship as underwriters for United Cigar
Manufacturers and Sears, Roebuck & Co. In more recent decades, the lead under-
writer has played a more important role than the other members of the syndicate, and
takes a greater proportion of the underwriting fee as well, while co-underwriters in
the early twentieth century took equal shares of responsibilities and fees.
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3.2.1 Information gathering theory
Some claim the main reason for the syndicate is for the gathering of information.
It is reasonable to believe that better knowledge of both the market's condition and
investors' interest would help the syndicate to make better deals in IPO, in respect of
the better price and a lower risk.
Among many proxies for the information set of an underwriter's syndicate,
reputation is the most impressive one. Carter and Manaster (1990) rst detect a
relationship between the underwriter reputation and the initial public offering, based
on the parallel theory of Rock (1986) which states that greater IPO underpricing is
associated with greater participation of informed investors. In addition, they claim
that underpricing is costly to the issuer.
Many papers continue to focus on the issue of underwriter reputation. Carter
and Dark (1993) examine the relationship between the reputation of investment banks
and the investors' subscription. They observe that ippers' performance in the IPO
aftermarket varies with respect to two underwriter groups. In the class of underwrit-
ers with a lower reputation, ippers are more likely to dominate the offerings as the
reputation increases. In the class with a higher reputation, however, the dominance
of ippers declines as the reputation increases. In addition, Carter et al. (1998) dis-
cover that the reputation of underwriters is relevant to the long term performance of
IPO shares.
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It is important to mention that in both papers, the authors used the Carter-
Manaster scale to measure the reputation of the underwriters. Under the Carter-
Manaster scale system only the underwriter with the highest reputation counts for
the reputation of the syndicate. Yet, the reason for choosing a single underwriter to
represent the whole syndicate is somewhat ungrounded. As a result, any analysis
based on this measurement may be potentially misleading.
Logue et al. (2002) document the relationship between underwriter reputation
and market activities during the IPO process. They nd that the underwriter rep-
utation is signicantly related to the pre-market underwriter activities, and weakly
related to the aftermarket price stabilization. Contrary to the previous research, the
relationship between the underwriters' reputation and issuer's returns was found not
to be signicant in this research.
3.2.2 Bookrunners' bargain theory
A strange and notable feature in the underwriting business is that the difference in
the gross spreads (underwriting service fees) between single underwriter and syndi-
cate underwriters is insignicant. In the U.S. market for a moderate sized IPO, for
example, the underwriting fee is 7% of the size. This is convincing evidence that
underwriters are not competing for the service fee.
Hu and Ritter (2007) assume that the bookrunners (lead underwriters) compete
for business contracts using their advantage regarding analyst coverage and offer
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prices, instead of competing using the underwriting fee. They nd that reasons for
larger underwriter syndicates are the increase in issue size, reduction in the inuence
of analyst coverage, and buyout backed IPOs. Consequently, the benets for issuers
of having multiple underwriters instead of a single one are greater bargaining power
in capital market, high offer prices and a lower underpricing level. Further benets
for issuers may include building a tight relationship with commercial banks in the
future. As their main concern was about managing underwriters, Hu and Ritter's
research did not cover the role of the member underwriters of the syndicate.
3.3 Data
The data in this chapter comes from the Hong Kong Exchange and concern initial
public offerings from November, 1999 to the end of 2005. The offer price, number
of shares offered and the date of the rst trading day of IPO shares are taken from
the IPO prospectus in the public database of the Hong Kong Exchange. Since trading
prices are sometimes missing from either source, the rst day open trading price and
trading volume data are collected from both Datastream and Yahoo! Finance (Hong
Kong)23. The sector classication follows the information from Datastream.
This period was relatively quiet in respect to shocks. Except for the internet
bubble, which was inuential all over the world, no other signicant bubble was
recorded in the Hong Kong market and other world nancial markets during this
23 Yahoo! Finance (Hong Kong): hk.nance.yahoo.com
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period. The internet bubble was much more moderate in the Hong Kong market than
in the U.S. Considering that other sectors of industry were not signicantly affected
by the internet bubble, data from the internet bubble period, from 1999 to 2001, is as
well included.
Data from after 2005 is excluded from our research because of the subsequent
potential inuence of the blooming of IPOs in the mainland China and the Hong
Kong markets. Regulation of the state owned shares changed, in the "Nontradable
Share Reform" launched by the China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC),
at the beginning of 2005 in mainland China, where the state owned shares played
the determinant role. As the consequence, the market situation has been changing
dramatically since this point.
3.4 Measuring Underwriter Syndicates
The most byzantine problem is how to measure the syndicates, given that their sizes
and members are highly divergent within the syndicate sample. Careful examina-
tion of the microstructure of the syndicates shows that there are normally two roles
represented in one syndicate. Some underwriters are lead underwriters and others
are member of the syndicate. For example, in the IPO case of Sinocom Software
Group Ltd., listing code 0299, there are 5 underwriters in the syndicate. As illus-
trated in Figure 3.1, Daiwa Securities is the lead underwriter. Guotai Jun'an Capital
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Limited and First Shanghai Securities are co-lead underwriters in this syndicate. The
members are Japan Asia securities and UOB Kay Hian (HK).
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Figure 3.1: The structure of underwriter syndicate: an example
In this section we concentrate on the following questions. First, do underwriter
syndicates have the best connection to the issuers' target investors? Here the term
"target investors" refers to those who have shown their interest in the IPO rm, or
have a potential interest in the offering. As investors' potential interest is difcult
to capture, those investors who have shown interest in the same industry sector (by
trading shares) is regarded as the target investors. Second, do underwriter syndicates
have enough information, experience and knowledge to set the initial offering price
of the shares being issued? In order to gain the knowledge of pricing, underwriters
are supposed to have extensive experience in issuing shares, especially shares in the
same industry. Third, is the leading underwriter capable of the proper conduct and
management of the syndicate? A high-quality leader will always guarantee a better
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Table 3.1: Top 10 underwriters by number of cases
outcome. It is thus reasonable to expect the leading underwriter to have more expe-
rience of the underwriting business than others in the syndicate, and hence to have
gained the ability from that experience to be a better leader.
3.4.1 Ranking underwriters by frequency
To start investigating specic features, a measuring system should be established
at the outset. By collecting the names of underwriters from IPO prospectuses, the
underwriter database has been created in this research. Table 3.1 shows the top 10
underwriters measured by the frequency of their appearance in the IPO cases, and the
full ranking list is given in Appendix 3.C.
The result of ranking underwriters by frequency is quite remarkable since the
international big names, such as Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley
or Merrill Lynch, are not included in the top 10 list. Instead, some local investment
banks, such as First Shanghai Capital Limited, Guotai Junan Securities (Hong Kong)
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Limited, and Kingsway Sw Securites Limited, take most of the positions in top 10
list. In addition, within the top 10 underwriters the number of their cases drops
quickly, as the number of cases of the underwriters ranked lowest is only about one
half of the number of top one.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of the number of cases that underwriters are involved.
Figure 3.2 illustrates that in the underwriting business, some underwriters do
have monopolistic power. First Shanghai Capital Limited, taking rst place in the
ranking, has been involved in 137 IPO cases, which is greater than a quarter of the
total number of cases in the whole sample. Moreover, Celestial Capital Limited, the
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Table 3.2: List of "industry experts" underwriters (part).
last underwriter in the top ten, is involved in more than one eighth of all cases. These
gures illustrate the high concentration of power in underwriting business.
Since the underwriting business is non-exclusive, it is impossible to measure
the market share of every underwriter. As the consequence, the Herndahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), the indicator widely used to measure competitiveness among the rms
in the market, does not apply here in the underwriting business.
Table 3.2 shows the most active (top ve) underwriters in two selected indus-
tries, the full list being given in Appendix 3.D. In Electronic and Electrical Equip-
ment industry sector, for instance, the frequencies of the underwriters in the top ve
are all similar to each other. According to the full list of active underwriters in dif-
ferent industries, we dene the top ve most active underwriters in an industry as the
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"industry expert underwriters", since it is reasonable to believe that the most active
underwriters in one industry are able to gain better knowledge from their experience.
Denition 1 If underwriter Ui is one of the industry expert in industry j, we dene
the expert property as follow.
Ui(j) = 1
otherwise,
Ui(j) = 0
3.4.2 Industrial coverage
Since one of the key features of the underwriter syndicate is that syndicates possess
a better knowledge of market conditions, and thus the ability to set a more accurate
offering price, it is a basic requirement that the members of a syndicate should be
able to cover more potential investors. As we assign the industry expert property
as being an industry expert to every underwriter, it is reasonable to believe that a
syndicate with more industry experts in its team is more informed about the market's
conditions. Let syndicate Rs(U s1 ; U s2 ; :::U sns) consist of nk underwriters. For a certain
underwriting syndicate, we dene the industrial coverage as follow.
Denition 2 For a syndicate Rk(U1; U2; :::Uns) the industrial coverage of the syn-
dicate ICk is
ICk =
jmaxX
j=1
(
knX
ki=1
Uki(j))
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where j represents a different industry. And for the same j, only the rst Uki(j) = 1
counts.
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Figure 3.3: The distribution of variable IC.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the distribution of the industrial coverage of the under-
writer syndicates. The average value of industrial coverage is 14.56 out of 34 in-
dustry sectors. It is clear that only a small number of syndicates achieve industrial
coverage of more than 25, indicating that the business is quite concentrated and that
a small group of underwriters take most of the market share.
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3.4.3 Syndicate expertise
In order to set the best offering price and investigate the market demand for shares
within a certain industry, syndicates are expected to be experts in the issuers' indus-
try.24 Otherwise, it is reasonable to believe syndicates could not price the IPO shares
properly, thus leaving issuers and themselves exposed to the risks of the market. Here
we dene syndicate expertise industry as follow.
Denition 3 The most covered industry sector J for a certain syndicate k is dened
by following relationship:
kinX
ki=1
Uki(j) = maxf
kinX
ki=1
Uki(j); j 2 (0; jmax)g
The syndicate expertise industry variable SE takes the value 1 if the most
covered industry sector J of a certain syndicate is the same as the issuer's industry
sector, and 0 otherwise. Figure 3.4 demonstrates statistical information about the
industrial expertise of the underwriter syndicate. Among 489 syndicates, only 80
syndicates' expertise in industry is not the same as for the issuers. The dominant
number of syndicates have the same industrial expertise as that of their clients.
3.4.4 Leaders' competence
As previously explained, there are normally two roles in a syndicate: those of the
members and the leader. A leading underwriter usually plays a more important role
than the other members, and also takes a greater proportion of the commission fee.
24 At least one member of syndicate has to be an expert.
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84%
16%
SE=1
SE=0
Figure 3.4: The distribution of variable SE:
Out of hundreds of underwriters, the issuer must be careful to select the best leading
underwriter. The basic criteria for selection of the leading underwriter should be as
follows. First, the leading underwriter is expected to be able to manage the syndicate
and introduce appropriate underwriters to the syndicate. Second, the leading under-
writer should be of high reputation in order to signal the quality of the underlying
assets behind the IPO shares. To represent these two requirements we use the rank
on the frequency list of the total number of IPOs (Appendix 3.C), which is related to
the suitability of a leading underwriter. This notion is in accordance with the previous
observation by Hayes (1971). Hayes discovers that the investment banking industry
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is characterised by an intrinsic hierarchy. The privileged investment banks have con-
siderable strength, particularly in the underwriting business. In addition, he suggests
that an investment bank establishes its own reputation in the following ways: relying
upon the partner's reputation, the capital strength of the bank itself, and its ability to
distribute securities. We dene the lead underwriters' competence in this research as
follows.
Denition 4 If the most highly ranked underwriter by frequency of participation in
IPOs is the leading underwriter in a syndicate, we dene
LCk = 1
Otherwise,
LCk = 0
As shown in Figure 3.5, the competent leaders' group dominates the syndicate
sample. Only 27 syndicates out of 489 do not choose the most highly ranked under-
writer as their lead underwriter. The proportion of the "Leader Competence" is much
greater than the "Industrial Expertise" group in Figure 3.4, suggesting that from an
issuer's perspective the choice of a leading underwriter with the highest reputation is
to be preferred when constructing an IPO syndicate.
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94%
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Figure 3.5: The distribution of variable LC:
3.4.5 Discussion
As the main purpose of the underwriting business is to sell IPO shares, the quality
of the underwriter syndicate is an important factor in the IPO's performance. The
measurements in this research, including industrial coverage (IC), industrial exper-
tise (SE) and leader competence (LC) construct the basic framework of the syndi-
cate analysis. In order to understand the impact of the syndicate's properties on IPO
performance, we run regression tests on the underpricing level (UP ) and the over-
subscription ratio (Oversub), both of which are widely accepted measures of IPO
performance. We dene the underpricing level as follows:
UP =
Popen   Poffer
Poffer
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where Popen and Poffer refer respectively to the rst trading day open price and the
offer price in the primary market of a certain offering. The variable Oversub rep-
resents the demand from the investors in the primary market and is calculated as
follows:
Oversub =
Nsub
Noffer
where Nsub and Noffer refer respectively to the number of shares subscribed by in-
vestors and shares offered by issuer in primary market. The underpricing level repre-
sents the level of mispricing of the IPO shares. Although some people believes that a
certain level of underpricing is necessary for many purposes, including choosing tar-
get investors and stimulating secondary market liquidity, severe underpricing of IPO
shares ultimately leads to extra cost for the issuer and turns out to be inefcient. In
addition, attempts that try to separate the necessary underpricing level from inef-
cient underpricing have never been successful in the existing literature. As a result,
we use the underpricing level as the level of cost for issuers.
At the aggregate level, besides the liquidity shocks caused by large block sell-
ing and by capitalisation of the IPO, the underpricing level is less severe when a
syndicate is expert in the issuer's industry. This can be seen on the Table 3.3 where
there is a negative correlation between the variable SE (indicator of industry specic
syndicate) and underpricing level. The result also illustrates that a better leader in the
syndicate (LC) and more industrial coverage (IC) is associated with a lower level of
underpricing, although the relationship between them is insignicant.
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The degree of oversubscription is also a principle means of measurement of
an offering. A successful underwriter syndicate is supposed to be able to encour-
age enough investors in the primary market. However, although oversubscription is
an important indicator for IPO performance, there is no universal optimal level for
oversubscription. Normally investors expect a moderate oversubscription ratio. An
extreme high oversubscription level suggests the offer price might be unreasonably
low, and further reveals that the underwriters are incapable of pricing the equity. A
severely low oversubscription ratio implies that it is possible that the offering is fac-
ing serious difculties in the primary market, and that the underwriters are incapable
of promoting the offering. Table 3.4 shows that the oversubscription is signicantly
inuenced by the variable LC, suggesting that strong leadership is the determinant
factor on the primary market performance. In addition, the coefcient signs of vari-
able LC vary in different industries, suggesting that the syndicates' impact diverges
with regard to the industry level.
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3.5 Underwriter Network Analysis
Up till now, the structure of the underwriter network remains unclear, and regarding
the questions about why and how the underwriters form syndicates we are still left
in the dark. This section focuses on the structure of the underwriter network and
discusses the detailed analysis performed by implementing the cutting edge network
analysis techniques.
In a network, we assume that the nodes are connected to each other by undi-
rected lines. Here we dene the undirected lines as that the nodes are equally weighted
at both ends of the links. In the underwriter network, the nodes are the individual un-
derwriters and the links are dened as the pair-wise connection when two underwrit-
ers cooperate in a syndicate. Again, we take Sinocom Software Group (listing code:
HK0299) as an example. As shown in Figure 3.1, the ve underwriters in the syn-
dicate cooperate in this IPO. Consequently, the underwriters in the syndicate have
a cooperative relationship in this syndicate. Normally, underwriters are involved in
many syndicates and have cooperative relationships with various other underwriters.
The purpose of this analysis is to characterise the complex relationship network and
discover the nature of the underwriting business network.
Further to examining the analysis techniques, we review and report an attempts
to implement various types of network analysis methods, including the ultra-matrix25,
binary-tree, etc. Among the different types of network, the random graph is the most
25 The ultra-matrix method has been implemented in Noah's ark problem analysis (Weitzman, 1998),
biodiversity studies (Brown and Shogren, 1998).
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adaptive technique used in describing underwriter networks. Random graph theory
has been implemented in many network analyses to describe the statistical properties
of graphs, such as distributions of sizes, and typical average nodes distance. Random
graph theory has also been powerful in analysing social collaboration networks, such
as boards of directors in companies, co-ownership networks of rms, collaborations
of scientists in research and even movie actors' networks. However, the traditional
random graph theory cannot t the empirical data used here perfectly. In this re-
search, we use adapted random graph theory (Newman et al., 2001), which has been
proved to be more convincing in exploring collaborative networks than the classic
theory.
Since the underwriter network is a collaborative one, in order to implement
the random network analysis, it is necessary to adapt the collaborative relationships
among nodes into pairwise relationships. The details of this adapting are explained
in Figure 3.6.26
3.5.1 The random graph with arbitrary degree distribution
Here we give a brief overview of the theory of the random graph with arbitrary degree
distribution. In random graphs, it is assumed that the existence of links between any
two nodes is independent of the existence of any other links. As a consequence, the
existence of the link is solely dependent on the probability p. For a network with N
nodes and the average probability of a link from one node is z, we have
26 The graph is adapted from Newman, Strogatz and Watts (2001)
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Figure 3.6: The adaption from a collaborative to a pairwise network.
p =
z
N   1 
z
N
when N is large
For an individual node, the probability distribution pk can be calculated as fol-
lows for the edges connected by k links:
pk =

N
k

pk(1  p)N k  z
ke z
k!
when N is large
which is a typical Poisson distribution. Suppose we have an undirected graph of N
nodes, and N is large. The generating function G0(x) is dened as follows:
G0(x) =
1X
k=0
pkxk,
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where the pk is the probability, and the generating function G0(x) represents the ag-
gregate probability distribution of nodes with k connections. The generating function
is normalised so that
G0(1) = 1:
In this setting, the distribution can be written as the following equation for the prob-
ability rz of having z as the size of group:27
rz=
z
z!
e(e
  1)
zX
k=1

z
k

[e ]k, (3.1)
where the coefcients

z
k
	
are the Stirling numbers of the second kind

z
k

=
kX
r=1
( 1)k r
r!(k   r)!r
z
and ,  are the average size of groups related for each node and the average size of
groups.
3.5.2 Empirical results
Figure 3.7 illustrates the distribution of the sizes of the underwriting syndicate in the
sample, and the distribution is clearly double peaked. The rst peak is around the
point where the size equals 3, and the other one is around the point where the size is
between 6 and 7.
27 The proof of equation (3.1) is in Appendix A, adapted from Newman, Strogatz and Watts (2001).
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of underwriting syndicate size
In the rst place, we assume that the underwriter network is a single united
network. Figure 3.8 illustrates the simulation result obtained by setting the parame-
ters according to the data sample. In the gure, the left axis represents the frequency
of a given syndicate size, and the right axis represents the simulated probability for
different syndicate sizes under the random graph settings. Although single peaked
simulation ts the empirical data well both at the left end of the graph and the right
end of the graph, however, it does not t the part of the data when syndicate size is
from 3 to 6. As a result, the single peaked assumption is not accepted and a further
test using a double peaked simulation hypothesis is needed. To identify the presence
of a double peaked distribution, we perform additional analysis of the relationship
between the distribution of syndicate size and the performance of IPOs as follows:
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Figure 3.8: Single peaked simulation and the distribution of syndicate size.
In the double peaked simulation, the signicant difference is that there are two
semi-groups in this simulation. First, it is assumed here that the syndicates are totally
separated into two groups, named group A and B. Secondly, this separation means
that the following rule applies in the double peaked simulation: the underwriter syn-
dicates in group A act in a way which is independent of their peers in group B, and
syndicates in group B act independently of their peers in group A. Another important
issue is to identify the right size of the group. Since it is clear that the separating line
lies at around size 5, the following analysis helps to identify the exact position of the
separating line:
C is a dummy variable representing different groups. In the rst correlation
test, we assume that the syndicates with a size equal to or smaller than 4 are in group
A, and the other syndicates are in group B. In the second test, group A contains the
syndicates with size smaller than or equal to 5 and group B contains other syndicates.
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Variables Volume OverSub CapOffer UP
Correlation
Coefficient 0.10328183 ** 0.1092051 ** 0.22408805 ** -0.0292289
Sig (2 tailed) 0.00709729 0.00599997 0.000001 0.44956567
N 455 0.10328183 490 455
Correlation
Coefficient 0.12635329 ** 0.13344413 ** 0.273401 ** -0.0354874
Sig (2 tailed) 0.00696281 0.0058647 0.000001 0.45017263
N 455 425 490 455
Variables Volume OverSub CapOffer UP
Correlation
Coefficient 0.0600929 0.06986187 0.1716425 ** -0.0113391
Sig (2 tailed) 0.11724566 0.07877451 3.6417E-06 0.76926336
N 455 425 490 455
Correlation
Coefficient 0.12635329 ** 0.13344413 ** 0.273401 ** -0.0354874
Sig (2 tailed) 0.00696281 0.0058647 0.000001 0.45017263
N 455 425 490 455
C
C
C
**Define C=1 if Syndicate size>5, C=0 otherwise
*Define C=1 if Syndicate size>4, C=0 otherwise
C
Kendall's
tau_b
Spearman's
rho
Kendall's
tau_b
Spearman's
rho
Table 3.5: Identifying the seperating line between two sub-groups
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The correlation tests indicates that the dummy variable C is signicantly correlated
with other identical variables in the rst correlation test. Those variables are indica-
tors of IPO performance. The variable Volume refers to the volume of shares offered
in the IPO. CapOffer is the capitalisation of the IPO shares with the offer price in
the primary market. The variables UP and OverSub are dened as in the previous
section.
The virtual separating line is not only clear in the correlation test, but signicant
in the gures. The following gures illustrate the relationships between the size of
the syndicate and other factors.
Figure 3.9: The distribution of Oversub and size of syndicates
In Figure 3.9, the separation of the two groups of syndicates is clear. To the
left hand of the line where the size is equal to 5, the frontier of variable Oversub
decreases along with the increasing size. Yet on the right hand of the line where the
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size is equal to 5, the trend of the frontier of Oversub is not as clear as it is to the
left. The maximum value of Oversub falls in the left hand group. Since the variable
Oversub represents the demand of the investors for the IPO shares, the distribution
indicates that the underwriter syndicate in the left group are more likely to stimulate
greater demand in respect of the subscription in the primary market for IPO shares.
Figure 3.10: Distribution of IPO Volume and Size of Syndicates
The result shown in Figure 3.10 is somehow surprising. Traditionally, peo-
ple have believed that the reason for having a syndicate rather than an individual
underwriter is that an individual underwriter is not able to deal with huge cases.
Conversely, Figure 3.10 shows that most huge cases, measured by volume, are un-
derwritten by the smaller syndicates. We would like to propose here a possible reason
for this empirical result: underwriters are now able to carry on large cases normally
while they are syndicating for some other purposes. At the beginning of the 20th
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century, underwriters were not able to deal with huge offerings. Yet it is not difcult
now to understand why the underwriters have greater power to raise funds and dis-
tribute equities, given the dramatic progress in information technology that has been
implemented in the nancial industry. Information technology makes individual un-
derwriters capable of gathering much precise market information and distributing a
great number of IPO shares. It is quite likely that the reputable underwriters only co-
operate with other underwriters with high reputations, and that underwriters with low
reputations can only work with those with low reputations.
Figure 3.11: Distribution of IPO capitalization and size of syndicates.
The separation is also in Figure 3.11, showing that the capitalisation's maxi-
mum limit before the line where size is equal to 4 rises with the increase of syndicate
size, and that the capitalisation limit drops sharply at the point where the size is equal
to 5. Except for some extreme cases around the point when size is at 15, most of the
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IPOs with a greater syndicate (more than 5) are relatively small in term of capitalisa-
tion.
Figure 3.12: Distribution of underpricing and the size of syndicates
As Figure 3.12 indicates, the size of the syndicate is essentially not relevant to
the underpricing level and the two groups of underwriter syndicates are not signi-
cantly inuential to the underpricing level. Since the major concern of investors in
IPO is the initial return of IPO shares, this result from the Hong Kong market is con-
sistent with the previous observations documented by Logue et al. (2002), that the
reputation of the underwriters in the syndicate is not directly relevant to the investors.
Following discussion the segmented network assumption, we simulate the dis-
tribution results of syndicates' size under a two sub-groups network. Detailed infor-
mation about the simulation of a two sub-groups underwriter network is presented in
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Appendix 3.B. Figure 3.13 illustrates the distribution and shows that the simulation
result ts the empirical result.
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Figure 3.13: Double peaked simulation and the empirical distribution of syndicate
size.
3.5.3 Remarks
In this section, we identied the sub-groups in the underwriter network using random
graph analysis of data from the Hong Kong equity market. In the two sub-groups,
underwriter syndicates do not only differ in size, but also vary signicantly in IPO
outcomes, including the offering sizes and oversubscription ratio. It is likely that the
underwriters gather into different groups according to their reputation, and reputable
underwriters usually form smaller syndicates.
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Yet some questions remain after the identication of sub-groups. First, is this
phenomenon unique to the Hong Kong market, or also true for other nancial mar-
kets? Additional empirical evidence is needed to answer this question. At the mo-
ment, few existing nancial databases include relevant information on syndicates,
given that academic scholars and practitioners in nancial industry have long ne-
glected the importance of the underwriting business. Second, the reason why under-
writers are divided into different sub-groups is unknown. It is possible that this is
the result of long-term market selection (such as natural selection). Allowing privi-
leged underwriters to enlarge their advantage in the business by using their reputation
and those of their syndicate partners, underwriters are polarised into highly reputable
sub-groups and less reputable sub-groups. Third, the reason why bigger syndicates
are not able to sufciently utilise their advantage of having better information to set
more accurate offering prices is unknown. These remaining questions open avenues
for further studies.
3.6 Concluding Discussion
In the majority of the literature about the IPO-related puzzles, underwriter syndicates
have not yet been critically examined. Scholars have ignored the importance of the
structure of the underwriting business and this ignorance has led to the following
difculties in the current research. First, to my knowledge no comparable results
can be used for reference for this research into the nature of underwriter syndicates
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and networks. Nevertheless, some research papers do mention the importance of
the underwriter syndicate and network, such as Carter and Manaster (1990), and
Hu and Ritter (2007). These authors emphasise the importance of the reputation of
the syndicate, or of the analyst resource. Second, underwriter syndicate data are
not widely available. In some leading nancial databases, only very limited data
on equity underwriting syndicates, such as the size of syndicates in the U.S. and
Canadian market, are available.
Some earlier research focused on the relationship between the underwriters'
reputation and the IPO performance, reected in the after market liquidity, under-
pricing level, and the long term performance. Yet this research selected the most
reputable underwriters in the syndicate or among the managing underwriters (lead
managing underwriters or co-managing underwriters). The interactions among un-
derwriter syndicates were disregarded and individual member underwriters were not
taken into account in those studies. Based on the subjective denition of the repu-
tation of the underwriter syndicates, those investigations may have led to imperfect
outcomes.
This chapter examined the structure of underwriter syndicates and presents in
detail ways of measuring the syndicates by considering both lead and member un-
derwriters. Using these measurements, the regression test illustrates that IPO per-
formance is related to the underwriter syndicate, while the relationship is not sig-
nicant with all parameters and in different levels. In addition, the distribution of
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syndicate size shows that there are sub-groups in underwriter networks and that the
performance of syndicates in the two sub-groups differs signicantly. This nding is
consistent with the hierarchy theory of Hayes (1971) and the argument that a larger
syndicate is usually associated with a lower analyst inuence (Hu and Ritter, 2007).
Although it remains unclear whether the grouping phenomenon is unique to the Hong
Kong equity market, the research presents evidence that one single underwriter can-
not characterise the entire syndicate. Research which employs only one underwriter
to represent the whole syndicate might therefore be potentially misleading. Above
all, this chapter shows that the perspective from the point of view of underwriter syn-
dicate is not only interesting, also necessary to understand underwriting business and
IPO performance.
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3.A The Distribution of Syndicate Size in A Single Group
Let us assume that in a undirected graph, every edge between any two vertices is
independently present or absent of any other edges, and the probability of the inde-
pendent present of the edge is p. If there is a graph with N vertices, the average
number of edges between vertices should be z = p(N   1). If we dene the number
of edges connected to any particular vertex k, then the probability pk should be
pk =
 
N
k

pk(1  p)N k N!1' z
ke z
k!
.
Then the generating function G0(x) for the probability distribution of vertex degree
k should be dened as:
G0(x) =
1X
k=0
pkx
k
Since the distribution pk is assumed to be normalized, we have
G0(x) = 1.
In this setting, the probability pk is given by the kth derivative of G0(x).
In a Poisson distributed graph, the distribution leads to a standard random
graph. As N is a large number, p = z
N
. G0(x) is given by
G0(x) =
NX
k=0
 
N
k

pk(1  p)N k ' ez(x 1)
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Consider in a bipartite graph of M IPOs and N underwriters, we dene the
average number of IPOs involved for underwriters as , and the average size of IPO
as , so we have

M
=

N
.
Thus, we can dene the generating function for the number of IPOs involved for
underwriters f0(x) and the size of IPOs g0(x) as
f0(x) =
X
j
pjx
j g0(x) =
X
k
qjx
j
Consider a Poisson-distributed numbers of both f0(x) and g0(x), we have
f0(x) = e
(x 1) g0(x) = e(x 1)
so f1(x) = df0(x)dx = f0(x) and g1(x) =
dg0(x)
dx
= g0(x). We nd that the generating
function for the graphs is:
G0 = f0(g1(x)) = exp[(e
(x 1)   1)]
We can then perform derivative and setting x = 0. For the probability r1 of syndicate
size 1, we nd
r1 = G
0
0(x) = e
 e(e
  1)
and for the probability r2 of syndicate size 2, we nd
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r2 = G
00
0(x) = 
2e(e
  1)(e  + 2e 2)
So the probability rz of syndicate size z should be
rz=
z
z!
e(e
  1)
zX
k=1

z
k

[e ]k (3.2)
where the coefcients

z
k
	
are the Stirling numbers of the second kind

z
k

=
kX
r=1
( 1)k r
r!(k   r)!r
z.
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3.B The Distribution of Syndicate Size under Two Sub-
groups
Consider now we have two independent groups of underwriters, group A and B,
where underwriters only cooperate with the underwriters within the same group. The
average number of IPOs involved for underwriters as A and B, and the average
size of IPO as A and B in group A and B accordingly. For the syndicate size z, we
nd the aggregate probability rz as
rz = ArzA + BrzB
where A and B are the proportion of IPOs in group A and B. The rzA and rzB can
be derived from the equation (3.2).
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3.C Overall Rank of Underwriters by Number of Cases
Underwriter Frequency Underwriter Frequency
First Shanghai Capital Limited 137 First Asia Financial Group Limited 19
Guotai Junan Securities (HK) Limited 113 Emperor Securities Limited 19
Kingsway Sw Securities Limited 105 Young Champion Securities Limited 18
Tai Fook Capital Limited 93 Sinopac Securities (Asia) Limited 18
Core Pacific - Yamaichi International (HK) Limited 93 Partners Capital International Limited 18
Sun Hung Kai International Limited 92 Anglo Chinese Corporate Finance Limited 18
Kingston Securities Limited 79 Sinpac Securities (HK) Limited 17
CSC Securities (HK) Limited 76 Pacific Challenge Capital Limited 17
DBS Asia Capital Limited 71 Japan Asia Securities Limited 17
Celestial Capital Limited 71 BCOM Securities Company Limited 17
Shenyin Wanguo Capital (HK) Limited 63 Christfund Securities Limited 16
SBI E2-Capital Securities Limited 62 AMS Corporate Finance Limited 16
BNP Prime Peregrine 60 Taiwan Concord Capital Securities (HK) Limited 15
South China Capital Limited 58 Pacific Foundation Securities Limited 15
JS Cresvale International Limited 58 Tanrich Securities Company Limited 14
Oriental Patron Asia Limited 57 Merrill Lynch Far East Limited 14
ICEA Capital Limited 56 Phillip Securities (HK) Limited 13
BOCI Asia Limited 54 Daiwa SBCM HK 13
Kim Eng Securities (HK) Limited 51 Yuanta Securities (HK) Company Limited 12
Barits  Securities (HK) Limited 51 TingKong-RexCapital Securities International Limited 12
TIS Taiwan International Securities (HK) Limited 48 The Bank of East Asia, Limited 12
Phoenix Capital Securities Limited 41 Sino Grade Securities Limited 12
Polaris Securities (HK) Limited 40 New Japan Securities International (HK) Limited 12
HSBC Investment Bank Asia Limited 38 Karl-Thomson Securities Company Limited 12
KGI Asia Limited 36 ING Barings 12
GC Securities Limited 36 Goldbond Capital (Asia) Limited 12
Dao Heng Securities Limited 36 G.K. Goh Securities (HK) Limited 12
Sanfull Securities Limited 35 Credit Suisse First Boston (HK) Limited 12
MasterLink Securities (HK) Corporation Limited 35 Toyo Securities Asia Limited 11
CLSA Global Emerging Markets 34 OSK Asia Securities Limited 11
Worldsec Corporate Finance Limited 33 NSC Securities (Asia) Limited 11
Koffman Securities Limited 33 HT Securities Limited 11
CEF Capital Limited 33 Grand Vinco Capital Limited 11
Vickers Ballas Capital Limited 32 CITIC Capital Market Limited 11
Luen Fat Securities Company Limited 32 Asia Financial (Securities) Limited 11
UOB Asia (HK) Limited 31 Somerley Limited 10
Taiwan Securities (HK) Company Limited 31 Sinomax Securities Limited 10
Get Nice Investment Limited 30 ABN AMRO Rothschild 10
CM-CCS Securities Limited 30 Yuanta Brokerage Company Limited 9
Core Pacific - Yamaichi Capital Limited 28 Vermont Securities Company Limited 9
Hantec Capital Limited 26 UBS Warburgh 9
CAF Securities Company Limited 26 Prudential Brokerage Limited 9
Nomura International (HK) Limited 25 Ong Asia Securities (HK) Limited 9
Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. 25 First Securities (HK) Limited 9
China Everbright Securities (HK) Limited 25 China Merchant Securities (HK) Co. Limited 9
Wintec Securities Limited 24 Asia Investment Capital Limited 9
South China Securities Limited 24 Upbest Securities Company Limited 8
China International Capital Corporation (HK) Limited 24 Yicko Securities Limited 8
Quam Securities Company Limited 23 Wocom Securities Limited 8
CU Securities Limited 22 Uni-Alpha Securities Limited 8
Cazenove Asia Limited 22 Rexcapital (HK) Limited 8
Watterson Asia Limited 21 Jardine Fleming Securities Limited 8
VC CEF Capital Limited 21 FB Gemini Securities Limited 8
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Asia Limited 21 Crosby Limited 8
Grand Cathay Securities (HK) Limited 21 China Southern Securities (HK) Limited 8
Ever-Long Securities Company Limited 21 Worldwide Finance (Securities) Limited 7
Deloitte & Touche Corporate Finance Limited 20 Platinum Securities Company Limited 7
YF Securities Company Limited 19 Mayfair Securities Limited 7
Shun Loong Securities Limited 19 IPO Securities Limited 7
Ka Wah Capital Limited 19 Interchina Securties Limited 7
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Underwriter FrequencyUnderwriter Frequency
ING Bank N.V. 7 Great China Brokerage Limited 3
e2 Capital Limited 7 Grand Investment (Securities) Limited 3
DL Brokerage Limited 7 Goodwill Financial Service ( Holding) Limited 3
Whole Win Securities Limited 6 Fuhwa Securities (HK) Co. Limited 3
Quest Stockbrokers (HK) Limited 6 Devonshire Securities Limited 3
Peace Town Securities Limited 6 Credit Lyonnais Securities (Asia) Limited 3
Lippo Securities Limited 6 Core Pacific Securities International Limited 3
Hung Sing Securities Limited 6 ASG Brokerage Limited 3
Guangdong Securities Limited 6 Advanced Partners Brokerage Limited 3
Deutsche Bank AG, Hong Kong Branch 6 Yicko GA Network Securities Limited 2
Citigroup 6 Worldvest Capital Limited 2
CCB International Capital Limited 6 Tiffit Securities (HK) Limited 2
Upsets Securities Company Limited 5 Thing On Securities Limited 2
Tung Tai Securities Co. Limited 5 Sun Delta Securities Limited 2
Stockwell Securities Limited 5 Success Talent Investments Limited 2
Salomon Smith Barney 5 South Capital Brokerage Limited 2
Open Offering Capital Limited 5 Paul Securities Limited 2
Liu Chong Hing Bank Limited 5 Pacific Pearl Securities Limited 2
JPMorgan 5 OUB Securities (HK) Limited 2
International Capital Network Limited 5 New Century Securities Limited 2
Gransing Securities Co. Limited 5 Macquarie Securities Limited 2
Coin Fall Limited 5 Lehman Brothers 2
CIMB-GK Securities (HK) Limited 5 Kay Hian Overseas Securities Limited 2
Bear Stearns Asia Limited 5 Honour Securities Company Limited 2
Baron Capital Limited 5 Hong Tong Hai Securities Limited 2
Altus Capital Limited 5 Genesis Global Strategies Limited 2
pacific foundation securities limited 4 Fulbright Securities Limited 2
Yu Ming Investment Management Limited 4 Friedmann Pacific Securities Limited 2
Standard Chartered Bank 4 Eagle Legend Securities Limited 2
Roctec Securities Company Limited 4 Dresdner Kleinwort Benson 2
Prudential-Bache Securities (HK) Limited 4 Delta Asia Securities Limited 2
Prime Securities Limited 4 Daewoo Securities (HK) Limited 2
Open IBN (HK) Limited 4 Cheung's Securities Brokers Limited 2
Onshine Securities Limited 4 Chelac Investment Company 2
New Universe Securities (HK) Limited 4 Chateron Corporate Finance Limited 2
KCG Securities Asia Limited 4 Business Securities Limited 2
Indosuez W.I. Carr Securities 4 Amsteel Securities (HK) Limited 2
Hooray Securities Limited 4 International Network Capital Limited 1
Hing Wong Securities Limited 4 Yue Xiu Securities Company Limited 1
Hani Securities (HK) Limited 4 Wellfull Securities Company Limited 1
First Sign Securities Limited 4 WAG Worldsec Corporate Finance Limited 1
EAA Securities Limited 4 Value Partners Limited 1
APC Securities Company Limited 4 V Six Securities Limited 1
Access Capital Limited 4 Troopers Securities Limited 1
Wing Hang Bank Limited 3 Tokai Tokyo Securities (Asia) Limited 1
Warburg Dillon Read 3 Times Securities Company Limited 1
Vinco Capital Limited 3 Tat Lee Securities Company Limited 1
Victorfield Securities Limited 3 Tartan Securities (Asia) Limited 1
VC Capital Limited 3 Tai Wah Securities Limited 1
Trustful Securities Limited 3 Sun Growth Securities Limited 1
TradingGuru.com Securities Limited 3 Stockmartnet Financial Services Limited 1
TISCO Securities HK Limited 3 Standard Bank Asia Limited 1
Standard Capital Limited 3 SPS Securities Limited 1
SG Securities 3 Shinko Securities (HK) Limited 1
Po Kay Securities & Shares Company Limited 3 SC Securities (Asia) Limited 1
Okasan International (Asia) Limited 3 Sassoon Securities Limited 1
Mansion House International Limited 3 President Securities (HK) Limited 1
Magnum International Securities Limited 3 OCBC Securities (HK) Limited 1
Kaiser Securities Limited 3 National Resources Securities Limited 1
Hui Kai Securities Limited 3 N M Rothschild&Sons 1
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Underwriter Frequency
Metro Capital Securities Limited 1
Malahon Securities Limited 1
Magusta Securities Limited 1
Lehin Securities Limited 1
Lee Tat & Co. 1
Kleinwort Benson Limited 1
Ke Capital (HK) Limited 1
J & A Securities (HK) Limited 1
Horwath Capital Asia Limited 1
Hing Wai Allied Securities Limited 1
Hang Seng Securities Limited 1
Grand Onward Securities Limited 1
Goldrich Securities Limited 1
GOA Securities Limited 1
Gateway Capital Limited 1
Gainwell Securities Limited 1
Fair Eagle Securities Company Limited 1
Eternal Pearl Securities Limited 1
Ernst & Young Corporate Finance Limited 1
Emperor Capital Limited 1
E*Trade Securities Co. Ltd 1
CSC Asia Limited 1
Chun Yick Securities Limited 1
Chow Sang Sang Securities Limited 1
China Insurance Group Securities Limited 1
Cheer Union Securities Limited 1
Capital Friend Securities Limited 1
Brighton Securities (HK) Limited 1
BOC International Holding Limited 1
Berich Brokerage Limited 1
Ample Capital Limited 1
Alta Finance Limited 1
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3.D Industry Expert Underwriters
Sector  Electronic, Electrical Equip. Sector  General Financial
Oriental Patron Asia Limited Kingsway Sw Securities Limited
First Shanghai Capital Limited Tai Fook Capital Limited
CSC Securities (HK) Limited JS Cresvale International Limited
Guotai Junan Securities (HK) Limited Guotai Junan Securities (HK) Limited
DBS Asia Capital Limited BOCI Asia Limited
Sector  General Retailers Sector  Real Estate
Sun Hung Kai International Limited Watterson Asia Limited
First Shanghai Capital Limited Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Asia Limited
DBS Asia Capital Limited HSBC Investment Bank Asia Limited
Dao Heng Securities Limited Tanrich Securities Company Limited
Tai Fook Capital Limited Tai Fook Capital Limited
Sector  Leisure Goods Sector  Travel & Leisure
First Shanghai Capital Limited Kingston Securities Limited
Oriental Patron Asia Limited Yu Ming Investment Management Limited
Kingsway Sw Securities Limited Luen Fat Securities Company Limited
JS Cresvale International Limited JS Cresvale International Limited
BOCI Asia Limited CSC Securities (HK) Limited
Sector  Household Goods Sector  Industrial Metals
Kingston Securities Limited Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Asia Limited
SBI E2-Capital Securities Limited China International Capital Corporation (HK) Limited
Kingsway Sw Securities Limited TIS Taiwan International Securities (HK) Limited
Kim Eng Securities (HK) Limited Taiwan Securities (HK) Company Limited
First Shanghai Capital Limited Tai Fook Capital Limited
Sector  Mobile Telecommunications Sector  Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Asia Limited Guotai Junan Securities (HK) Limited
China International Capital Corporation (HK) Limited Kingsway Sw Securities Limited
Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. First Shanghai Capital Limited
Sector  Software & Computer Services Core Pacific - Yamaichi International (HK) Limited
Core Pacific - Yamaichi International (HK) Limited Polaris Securities (HK) Limited
First Shanghai Capital Limited Sector  Construction & Materials
Celestial Capital Limited Kingston Securities Limited
CSC Securities (HK) Limited First Shanghai Capital Limited
Vickers Ballas Capital Limited Oriental Patron Asia Limited
Sector  General Industrials Guotai Junan Securities (HK) Limited
Sun Hung Kai International Limited CSC Securities (HK) Limited
Kingston Securities Limited Sector  Industrial Transportation
Get Nice Investment Limited ICEA Capital Limited
First Shanghai Capital Limited BNP Prime Peregrine
CAF Securities Company Limited South China Capital Limited
Sector  Personal Goods Oriental Patron Asia Limited
Tai Fook Capital Limited Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Asia Limited
Guotai Junan Securities (HK) Limited Sector  Oil Equipment & Services
Sun Hung Kai International Limited Guotai Junan Securities (HK) Limited
Kingston Securities Limited Tai Fook Capital Limited
South China Capital Limited South China Capital Limited
Sector  Technology Hardware & Equip. Partners Capital International Limited
Kingsway Sw Securities Limited ICEA Capital Limited
Guotai Junan Securities (HK) Limited
First Shanghai Capital Limited
DBS Asia Capital Limited
CSC Securities (HK) Limited
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Sector  Food & Drug Retailers Sector  Equity Investment Instruments
BNP Prime Peregrine Upbest Securities Company Limited
pacific foundation securities limited TIS Taiwan International Securities (HK) Limited
Wintec Securities Limited Shenyin Wanguo Capital (HK) Limited
UOB Asia (HK) Limited Kingston Securities Limited
Uni-Alpha Securities Limited First Shanghai Capital Limited
Sector  Support Services Sector  Mining
Kingsway Sw Securities Limited Merrill Lynch Far East Limited
SBI E2-Capital Securities Limited Deutsche Bank AG, Hong Kong Branch
CSC Securities (HK) Limited China International Capital Corporation (HK) Limited
Core Pacific - Yamaichi Capital Limited China Everbright Securities (HK) Limited
BNP Prime Peregrine Sector  Forestry & Paper
Sector  Healthcare Equipment, Services VC CEF Capital Limited
Sun Hung Kai International Limited Tai Fook Capital Limited
ICEA Capital Limited Sinopac Securities (Asia) Limited
First Shanghai Capital Limited Guotai Junan Securities (HK) Limited
Celestial Capital Limited GC Securities Limited
CEF Capital Limited Sector  Beverages
Sector  Industrial Engineering SBI E2-Capital Securities Limited
SBI E2-Capital Securities Limited Pacific Foundation Securities Limited
Sun Hung Kai International Limited Guotai Junan Securities (HK) Limited
Tai Fook Capital Limited First Shanghai Capital Limited
Oriental Patron Asia Limited CAF Securities Company Limited
Kingsway Sw Securities Limited Sector  Nonlife Insurance
Sector  Automobiles & Parts Ka Wah Capital Limited
The Bank of East Asia, Limited BNP Prime Peregrine
Partners Capital International Limited Worldsec Corporate Finance Limited
Kingsway Sw Securities Limited Shenyin Wanguo Capital (HK) Limited
Guotai Junan Securities (HK) Limited Nomura International (HK) Limited
First Shanghai Capital Limited Sector  Life Insurance
Sector  Banks Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Asia Limited
Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C. HSBC Investment Bank Asia Limited
HSBC Investment Bank Asia Limited Goldman Sachs (Asia) L.L.C.
BOCI Asia Limited Deutsche Bank AG, Hong Kong Branch
UBS Warburgh Credit Suisse First Boston (HK) Limited
TingKong-RexCapital Securities International Limited Sector  Fixed Line Telecommunications
Sector  Media DBS Asia Capital Limited
Tai Fook Capital Limited China International Capital Corporation (HK) Limited
First Shanghai Capital Limited Wocom Securities Limited
Sun Hung Kai International Limited Whole Win Securities Limited
Kingsway Sw Securities Limited Vermont Securities Company Limited
CEF Capital Limited Sector  Electricity
Sector  Chemicals Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Asia Limited
Sun Hung Kai International Limited Merrill Lynch Far East Limited
Kingston Securities Limited China Merchant Securities (HK) Co. Limited
First Shanghai Capital Limited BOCI Asia Limited
Core Pacific - Yamaichi International (HK) Limited Sector  Oil & Gas Producers
Yuanta Securities (HK) Company Limited China International Capital Corporation (HK) Limited
Sector  Food Producers BOCI Asia Limited
Sun Hung Kai International Limited Worldsec Corporate Finance Limited
Guotai Junan Securities (HK) Limited Tai Fook Capital Limited
Tai Fook Capital Limited Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Asia Limited
First Shanghai Capital Limited
Core Pacific - Yamaichi International (HK) Limited
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Chapter 4
Study on IPO-related Puzzles from the
Perspective of Global Games
4.1 Introduction
The research on IPO-related puzzles is extensive. Many theoretical explanations are
proposed for these puzzles, including information asymmetry (Michaely and Shaw,
1994; Sherman and Titman, 2002), investors' sentiment (Ritter, 1984; Barberis and
Thaler, 2003), and legal risk (Tinic, 1988; Drake and Vestsuypens, 1993). Yet the
risk of failure of the IPO caused by an insufcient number of investors' participation
in the offering, related to the coordination problem, has not yet been well discussed.
It also comes as surprise that the IPO process has not been considered explicitly from
the perspective of the coordination problem. In this chapter, we provide a model from
the perspective of coordination problem. This research starts from the concerns on
the selling method and issuers' pricing strategy for the IPO shares.
In general, people use the auction and the bookbuilding methods in the IPO
process. Sherman's (2005) survey of 44 countries shows that issuers choose to use
the bookbuilding more frequently than to use the auction method. The bookbuilding
method is the preferred choice in most of the IPO cases. Many nancial markets in
the world have used the auction method for going-public rms; however, the auction
147
method was not able to survive for long. Documented by Kutsuna and Smith (2004),
the Japanese market demonstrates the change over between two selling methods.
The discriminatory auction method of issuing shares has been the sole required sell-
ing method since 1989 in Japan. Since 1997, in which year the bookbuilding method
was introduced as an alternative method, almost all issuers have chosen bookbuild-
ing. However, the auction method is usually believed to be the optimal way of selling
goods and assets, and the bookbuilding method is widely perceived to be very expen-
sive. Up till now, the comparison on the issuers' proceeds between these two selling
methods has not yet been performed in a theoretical framework.
Meanwhile, underpricing of IPO shares has been documented worldwide. Dur-
ing the period from 1990 to 1998, the underpricing of IPO shares caused a $27 billion
loss for the issuers in the U.S. market (Loughran and Ritter, 2002). Yet no consen-
sus has yet been reached among scholars on the issue of the underpricing puzzle.
In addition, the relationship between the underpricing and the quality of IPO shares
is not clear. The signalling model (Jegadeesh et al., 1993) predicts that the under-
pricing level is negatively related with the quality of equity, while empirical studies
(Garnkel, 1993; Jain and Kini, 1994; Espenlaub and Tonks, 1998) show that there
is no monotonic relationship between underpricing and the quality of asset.
In this chapter, we propose a model from the perspective of a coordination
problem. In the framework of global games, we aim to explore the difference of
the two offering methods and the underpricing puzzle regarding the coordination
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problem. By presenting the model of global games, this chapter sheds light on the
following questions. First, is there signicant difference between the bookbuilding
method and the auction method, regarding both the issuers' proceeds and the offer-
ing prices? Second, why are the IPO shares mispriced and what is the relationship
between the underpricing level and the quality of IPO shares? From the perspec-
tive of a coordination problem, we suggest that the mispricing of IPO shares is the
result of issuers' strategies. The model implies that the relationship between under-
pricing level and the quality of equity is non-monotone. Further to the auction and
bookbuilding methods, we suggest that the two offering methods are essentially in-
different for the issuers' proceeds in the noise vanishing market conditions, and the
auction method can be better in the noisy market. We believe that rather than max-
imising the proceeds in the offering, issuers choose bookbuilding method for other
reasons, such as introducing favorable investors, maintaining after-market liquidity,
and providing price support.
The following sections are organised as follows. After the literature review in
Section 4.2, we describe the model in Section 4.3, and discuss the model in Section
4.4. Conclusions are presented in Section 4.5.
4.2 Literature Review
It seems that the auction method fails in the competition with the bookbuilding
method for IPOs. The survey by Jagannathan and Sherman (2006) shows that in
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IPO cases auctions have been implemented in more than 20 countries in the past and
have been used for all sizes of offerings. However, as alternative methods are in-
troduced, the auction method fades out in the IPO business. For example, Italy rst
introduced the auction method in the early 1980s and then abandoned it in 1986.
The bookbuilding method was introduced into Italy in 1992 and then came to dom-
inate the market. The survey also suggests that the variation in participation is a
major problem for the auction method. Jagannathan and Sherman argue that there is
a trade-off between participation levels and auctions. Too much attention to an of-
fering may lead to the winner's curse (when winners are paying more than a fair
price) or a free riding problem and ultimately a mispricing of the IPO shares, while
too little attention makes the IPO fail. Under the bookbuilding method, however, the
underwriter can be the gatekeeper, controlling the number of investors and the type
of entrants.
Logue et al. (2002) provide some detailed evidence on what underwriters can
do during the IPO process. They believe that the underwriting business is a series
of related decisions regarding the offering price and offering strategy. Knowing the
underwriting service history, underwriters are able to distinguish different type of in-
vestors. As Sherman (2005) concludes, the choice between auction and bookbuilding
methods does not solely depend on the underpricing level and other parameters about
the IPO performance. People do agree that the bookbuilding method now dominates
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the IPO market; however, no agreement has been reached on the reasons why it is the
case.
Nevertheless, some people do care about performance of IPOs regarding to
the choice between the two selling methods. Pukthuanthong et al. (2005) investi-
gate a data sample from 1999 to 2004 in the U.S. market. They nd that the auction
method leads to lower underwriter spreads (underwriting fee), less underpricing and
a greater trading turnover, while IPOs using bookbuilding are always followed by
positive post-IPO analyst coverage. The bookbuilding method may in some way be
problematic in pricing the IPO shares, given the long-term underperformance asso-
ciated with the bookbuilding method. Following the comparison, they argued that
bookbuilding IPOs has been over used at the moment. Derrien and Womack (2003)
investigate French IPOs during 1992 to 1998 and nd that auctions were better at
incorporating market condition information into the IPO price and thus produces a
lower underpricing level and lower variance of underpricing. However, Kutsuna and
Smith (2004) document the evidence from Japan and suggest that the aggregate costs
of bookbuilding and auction are similar. Moreover, the bookbuilding system in Japan
enables more accurate valuation of rms.
The seemingly conicting evidence suggests that the advantage of the book-
building method is not dominant regarding the performance and the issuers' pro-
ceeds. Issues' decision on the selling method can be based on some other consider-
ations, such as the allocation of shares to target investors (Brenan and Franks, 1997;
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Stoughton and Zechne, 1998), to increase the after-market liquidity (Booth and Chua,
1996), and price stabilisation activities (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1996; Ellis, Michaely,
and O'Hara, 2000).
Given that the mispricing of IPO shares is a widely accepted phenomenon, it
is curious to know the relationship between the underpricing level and the quality of
IPO shares. Although it is of great theoretical and practical importance to investigate
this relationship, the relevant direct evidence is rare in the existing literature. Inves-
tigation on this relationship is quite difcult for the following two reasons. First,
the quality of asset is difcult to measure. Generally researchers use some prox-
ies of the quality of asset in their investigations, including the sales of the rm, the
proportion of insider trading, aftermarket performance, etc. However, none of those
proxies is able to represent the quality of equity directly. A comprehensive measure
of the quality of equity has not yet been established. Second, most research focus
on the existence of linear relationship, ignoring the non-linear relationship between
the underpricing and the proxies of quality of equity. Considering the widely used
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) analysis, the ignorance of the non-linear relationship
is partly due to the insufcient analysis technique on the non-linear relationship. As
a result, the non-monotonic relationship between the underpricing and the quality
of equity has been long overlooked and the direct evidence is insufcient regarding
this non-monotone relationship. We present some indirect empirical ndings in the
literature below.
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Jain and Kini (1994) investigate the post-issue performance of the IPO rms,
using the sample of 682 IPO rms in the U.S. market. In this research, the authors use
the post-issue performance (the selling and earning in the three years after IPO) as
the proxies for the quality of IPO shares. By splitting the sample into two groups by
median underpricing level, Jain and Kini show that there is no monotonic relationship
between the post-issue performance and the level of underpricing of IPO shares.
Garnkel (1993) tests the relationship among the IPO underpricing, the insider
selling volume and the subsequent equity offering, using the sample of 549 IPOs
from 1980 to 1983 in the U.S. market. The author considers the insider selling vol-
ume and the subsequent equity offering as the proxies of the quality of equity. The
result of the research shows the relationship between the underpricing level and the
quality of equity. After controlling for other variables, the result shows that there is
no monotonic relationship between the underpricing level and the likelihood of reis-
sue and the announcement of a seasoned offering. In addition, there is no monotonic
relationship between the underpricing level and insider trading volume. This result
is consistent with Espenlaub and Tonks' (1998) nding that there is no monotonic
relationship between the underpricing level and the quality of equity. Using the nor-
malised capitalisation (ln(cap)) of IPOs as a proxy, we can also see the non-monotone
relationship from the IPO data from the Hong Kong market. (Figure 4.1)28
28 Source: the Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Limited (http://www.hkex.com.hk) and Datas-
tream. The bold line is depicted following the model in this chapter.
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Figure 4.1: The relationship betwen u and normalised capitalisation in the Hong
Kong market.
Although it seems that there is no monotone relationship, this non-monotonic
relationship remains. In this chapter we perform an analysis from the perspective
of coordination problem in the IPO process, in order to discover this non-monotone
relationship between the choice of selling methods and the performance of IPO shares
(quality of the investment project).
4.3 The global game and the IPO process
4.3.1 The global game
The idea of global games is due to Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and was further
developed by Morris and Shin (2002), Frankel et al. (2003), and Heidhues and Melis-
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sas (2006) among others. The essential assumption of the global game theory is that
of the incomplete information. Within a global game, each player observes the sig-
nals, with some noise, and makes his choice within his action sets. To illustrate the
purpose of global game theory, and the importance of the assumption of incomplete
information, let us consider start with Carlsson and van Damme's 2 2 games.
a2 b2
a1 θ,θ θ-1,0
b1 0,θ-1 0,0
Figure 4.2: Payoff structure of the global game sample (2 2)
The two players' payoff structure is shown in Figure 4.2. The variable  repre-
sents the fundamental (true) value of an investment project and we assume  is known
to both players. In the payoff structure, the actions a1 and a2 stand for "invest", while
the actions b1 and b2 stand for "not invest". Then for   1 each player has a dom-
inant strategy to invest, (a1; a2); for   0 each player has a dominant strategy not
to invest, (b1; b2). If  lies between 0 and 1, there are two Nash equilibria in pure
strategies: both invest and both not invest.
In the case ofm players, let u(1; n; ) denote payoff for the player who chooses
action 1 (invest) which depends on the underlying fundamental  and the fraction of
agents n who invest too. Then the expected payoff::
n + (1  n)(   1) =  + n  1
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is non-negative if sufcient large fraction of agents invest, that is if, and only if:
n  1  :
It is straight forward to relate this to the IPO game. There are two periods 0 and
1. There is a continuum of risk neutral investors of measure 1 indexed by i 2 [0; 1]
who in period 0 participate in primary IPO issuing. The value of the project depends
on the underlying state  which is now random and uncertain at the beginning. The
prior of random variable  is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 1 and
precision  = 1
21
where 21 is a variance;   N(1; 1)
The nancing of the project goes through buying a shares where each investor
is allowed to buy one share. All decision are made at t = 0: The project will succeed
yielding positive ex ante payoffE() c, if sufciently large number of agents decide
to buy shares. Otherwise it will fail yielding payoff  c; where 0 < c < 1 is a cost of
investment (price of one share).
Denote by n the proportion of investors who buy the shares. Corresponding
payoff for investor i provided the investor buys the share is given by:
ui =
8<: 1  c n  1   c n < 1   (4.1)
In the above game the actions are strategic complements since it payoffs for
player i to invest if and only if the project is successful and in turn, the project is
successful if and only if sufciently large fraction of other investors invest. Also
156
the game experiences positive externalities since the payoff is increasing function in
actions of others.
Global game theory has been applied to describe various economic phenomena,
including debt pricing problems, currency crises and bank runs (Morris and Shin,
2002). In this research we take the IPO process as a coordination problem for the
following two reasons. First, in the real world, a project cannot start without sufcient
investment. Insufcient funds lead to failure in initialising an investment project.
Second, investors' decisions do rely on others' decisions. A protable project may
fail to fund itself because of insufcient number of investors participating in IPO. In
this chapter we will implement global game theory with regard to the IPO process,
to explore the optimal strategies of different players in the game.
4.3.2 The IPO process
In the model, we suggest the basic problem that underwriters need to solve is the
coordination problem in the IPO process. The investor can only make prot by in-
vesting in IPO shares if the project is successful, and the project can be successful if,
and only if, there is a sufcient number of investors investing. If the process of the
offering is not successful and the fund-raising target cannot be achieved, the issuer
may withdraw the offering and the investment fails.
In this research, we consider three subjects in the IPO game. The rst one is the
underwriter. Underwriters are the only fully informed player in the game and their
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only aim is to achieve the best probability of success of the IPO. Considering their
monopolistic position in the offering, underwriters are able to decide the proportion
of shares issued in the primary market and the secondary market by incorporating
information about investors' perceptions of the IPO shares in both markets.
The second subject is that of the issuer. Issuers want to raise enough funds for
the project in the IPOs, and their aim is to raise as much funding as possible. This
requires the underwriter to achieve the highest possible selling prices in both markets,
provided the IPO is successful.
There are two types of contracts between issuer and underwriter: the best-effort
contract and the commitment contract. We concentrate on the commitment contract
in this research as it is the most commonly used contract type. Under the commitment
contract, underwriters suffer the loss if the IPO fails. As a result, underwriters do
their best by collecting information to avoid failure.
The third subject is that of the institutional investors. The institutional investors
can submit their bids to underwriters in the roadshow and the underwriters distin-
guish them from other ordinary investors. Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003) doc-
umented that underwriters favour some institutional investors that are frequently in-
volved in IPOs and thus place favorable IPO shares to them. Benveniste and Spindt
(1989) suggest that investors supply their private information about the IPO shares
to the underwriters in return. In addition, it is reasonable to believe that those in-
stitutional investors that are favoured in the allocation of shares are willing to hold
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the shares in the rst few trading days in the secondary market as a return to the
underwriters.
We assume the IPO game is in a game of imperfect (noisy) information. All
investors receive a noisy signal regarding the value of the project. Yet investors in the
rst stage of selling can only observe  with some noise. The investors in the second
stage collect information about  by observing the price in the rst stage. Only the
underwriters know the realisation of  in the game. Based on their own perception of
signals, players make decisions independently.
In the model, we assume the auction method as one stage selling. The issuer
sells out all the shares in the auction and thus do not participate in the secondary
market. On the contrary, the model consider the bookbuilding method completely
nished only after when the holding period of institutional investors expires. Issuers
sell a fraction of the shares in primary market and keep the rest of the shares for
secondary market selling. Normally this holding period lasts from 1 to 3 days after
when the secondary market is launched. As a result, the rst few days in the sec-
ondary market is the second selling stage in our model. Figure 4.3 illustrates the two
selling stages.
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Figure 4.3: Bookbuilding method: a two-stage selling model
4.3.3 The coordination problem
The coordination problem is critical for underwriters in IPO, as the major task for
the underwriters is to solve the coordination problem during the offering from the
investors' perspective.
Stories such as bank runs are quite similar to the IPO game. In a bank run,
it is claimed that because of ambiguous information about the bank, the distressed
borrowers are facing the same problems as the investors face in the IPO game. Morris
and Shin (2002) discuss the bank run problem as a coordination problem. In addition,
Dasgupta (2001) argues that this is also true for foreign direct investment (FDI) if
the investors are facing similarly ambiguous information on the state of the national
economy and the risk involved.
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In IPO, the investors may acquire knowledge about the underlying project from
the prospectus released by the issuers and analysts' reports about the project; how-
ever, investors may face two problems in collecting relevant information. On one
hand, the information is costly, as most of the investors need to pay for the analysts'
reports. On the other hand, considering the issuers and underwriters are trying to pro-
mote the offerings by providing optimal information about the investment project,
real information about the investment is somewhat vague. If the IPO fails to raise
enough funds, the shares in investors' accounts can be valueless.
Beside fundamental analysis, we nd that there is another channel to transmit
information about the funding situation of the project. At the end of the primary
market, the offering price becomes public information. The trading price in primary
market could be an important signal of the investors' information about the value
of the investment in primary market. The investors in the secondary market rely on
the offering prices from the primary market to adjust their information set about the
value of IPO shares.
4.4 The Model
Below we model two offering methods: auction and bookbuilding. In the model, the
auction method is a one-stage selling method, mainly discussed as the benchmark
model, and bookbuilding is regarded as a two-stage selling method.
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4.4.1 Auction: the benchmark model
In the auction method, once the shares have been sold out, the selling process ends.
We seek for an equilibrium here following Morris and Shin (1997). We assume that
the prior distribution of  is a common knowledge. In addition we assume that each
investor receives private noisy signal about the true value  in the form:
xi =  + "i; (4.2)
where "i is distributed normally with mean 0 and precision  = 122 and independently
among investors, that is for i 6= j, "i and "j are independent; "i  N(0; 1 ). Given
his own signal xi, ith investor will choose one of two actions: invest a = 1 or to not
invest a = 0 in order to maximize his expected payoff, that is:
a(x) = argmax
a
E[u(a; n; )jx]: (4.3)
Since xj  N(; 1

) the fraction of investors who buy the shares is given by:
n() =
Z
a(x)
p
(
p
(x  ))dx: (4.4)
where  stands for standard normal probability distribution.
In a monotone or threshold equilibrium there is a threshold x such that for any
realization of his own signal x the investor will buy the share (a(x) = 1) if and only
if x  x: By inspecting (4.4) we see that n() is increasing in  so that there exists
also a threshold  such that the project is successful if and only if   : The pair
of switching values (x; ) characterise the equilibrium.
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From (4.4), it follows that the fraction of agents who receive the signal x  x
is given by:
n() =
Z 1
x
p
(
p
(x  ))dx = 1  (
p
(x   )) (4.5)
where  stands for standard standard normal probability function. Since n() is
increasing in  and project is successful if and only if    it follows that  is
unique solution of the equation n() = 1   :
(
p
(x   )) =  (4.6)
On the other hand given the project is successful the expected payoff of an investor
given his signal x is given by:
E(U) = P (  jx)(1  c)  (1  P (  jx))c = P (  jx)  c:
At switching point x the marginal investor is indifferent between investing and not
investing and his expected payoff is zero what implies:
P (  jx) = c (4.7)
Equations (4.6) and (4.7) dene an equilibrium where the price of share c is set for
marginal investor. In order to proceed we have to nd distribution of  conditional
on x: By Bayes rule conditional on x,  is normally distributed with mean:
 =
+ x
+ 
and the precision
1
+ 
:
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Now in equilibrium equation (4.7) can be written as
1  
p
+ 

   + x
+ 

= c
from which we can express x as
x =
+ 

   

 
p
+ 

 1(1  c):
Substituting x in (4.6) we get the equation for the equilibrium value of :
F ()     

p

(   1) 
r
1 +


 1(1  c)

= 0: (4.8)
Because F () is continuous going from  1 to +1 the existence of equilibria is
guaranteed. Taking the rst derivative of F () in respect to  it is easy to show that
the equilibrium will be unique if p

<
p
2 as in that case F () is monotonic in .
In real nancial markets, investors receive information about the investment
project along with some noise. As we cannot ignore the noise, the equilibrium con-
dition should be:


p

(   1) 
r
1 +


 1(1  c)

=  (4.9)
Because investors are risk neutral, the second condition for the equilibrium is:
Pr( > jx) = c. (4.10)
Provided that p

<
p
2 (it is always the case if the prior is diffuse enough
relative to ), there is monotonic relationship between c and . By considering the
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two conditions (4.9,4.10) for the equilibrium, we can solve:
c = 
 s

+ 
 1()  p
+ 
(   1))
!
(4.11)
In the noise vanishing equilibrium when there is no noise in private signals
( !1) from equation (4.11), it follows c = . The result suggest that the offering
price must be at the same level of the quality of the IPO shares.
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Figure 4.4: The offering price c under different market conditions.
Figure 4.4 illustrate the offering price in the equilibrium under the noisy van-
ishing condition and noisy condition29. It is clear the offering prices vary in differ-
ent market conditions regarding the quality of IPO shares..The offering price can be
higher in the noisy market than in the noisy vanishing market when  is at a lower
29 In the setting, we assign the parameters as following:  = 1 and  = 0:5.
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level. And the offering price is lower when  is at the higher level. The result sug-
gests that the quality of IPO shares is not so clearly reected in the offering price in
a noisy market as in a noise-vanishing market.
As the trading price of IPO shares is equal to the true value  at the end of the
offering, the mispricing level can be dened as u =  c
c
. The result shows that the
IPO shares are underpriced (the mispricing u is positive) when  is high, while they
are overpriced (the mispricing u is negative) when  is low. There is no mispricing
at the extreme cases ( = 0 and  = 1), when the offering price c are 0 and 1
respectively.
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Figure 4.5: The relationship between the mispricing level u and the value of IPO
shares.
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Figure 4.5 shows the result of the mispricing level across  in the equilibrium.
The model implies that underpricing is related to the higher quality of IPO shares
while overpricing is signalling for a lower quality. Contrary to existing theoretical
literature, in the underpricing part the model implies that the underpricing level is
non-monotonically related to the quality of equity . Before some value of , the
underpricing u increases with  while decreases with  after the critical point.
4.4.2 Bookbuilding: a two-stage selling model
In the bookbuilding method, there are two stages: the primary market (rst stage)
and the rst few days in the secondary market (second stage). We assume that in the
bookbuilding method investors participate either in the rst stage or in the second
stage.
The assumptions for the game are as follows. There are two periods 1 and 2.
Risk neutral investors are divided into two groups. The investors in the rst group
i 2 [0; ] choose their actions in period 1, and investors in the second group i 2 (; 1]
choose their actions in period 2. The shares are priced at c1 and c2 in period 1 and 2
respectively. As before the nancial status of the investment project is summarised
by  and its common prior is   N(0; 1

):
The utility function for investors in both periods are as follows, where n denotes
the total number of investors that make the investment decisions in both stages:
u(I1; n; ) =

1  c1
 c1
n  1  
otherwise
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u(I2; n; ) =

1  c2
 c2
n  1  
otherwise
u(N; n; ) = 0
I1, I2 and N denote the investors who invest now (period 1), investors who invest
later (period 2) and those investors who never invest in this IPO.
The information structure is as follows. During the period 1, the investors
(i 2 [0; ]) observe the status of the investment project with idiosyncratic noise. The
private signal received by agent i is
xi =  + "xi "xi  N(0; 1

)
In the second period the investor i (i 2 [0; ]) receives noisy information about
the status of the project through two channels. The rst one is his own private signal:
yi = c1 + "yi "yi  N(0; 1

)
As the investor observes the price c1 his second channel is the public signal30:
c1 =  + i;   N(0;
1

)
The investors adopt the monotone strategy in this game. This means that the
investor (i 2 [0; ]) will only invest if xi  x. The investor (i 2 (; 1]) will only
invest if yi  y. The project will only succeed if, and only if,   . Performing
essentially the same analysis as in the benchmark (one stage selling) model we arrive
30 Here we assign ; ; and  for precision of public signal, private signals in period 1, and private
signals in period 2 respectively.
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at the following equilibrium condition:
1 + (1  )2 = 1   (4.12)
where
1  [ p

(   1) 
r
1 +


 1(1  c1)]
2  [ p

(   c1) 
r
1 +


 1(1  c2)]:
If we look at (4.12) then there are no unique solutions c1() and c2() so we have
to impose some additional objective like maximizing proceed.
Considering the following problem:
max
c1;c2
[1c1 + (1  )2c2] (4.13)
s.t.
1 + (1  )2 = 1   (4.14)
and rst the noisy vanishing equilibrium ( ! 1,  ! 1) in which 1 ! 1   c1
and 2 ! 1  c2: The equation 1+(1 )2 = 1  has a unique solution c1 =
c2 = :In terms of n1 and n2 (numbers of shares sold in stage 1 and 2 respectively),
n1 = (1  c1), n2 = (1  )(1  c2), the problem reads
max
n1;n2
n1(1  n1

) + n2(1  n2
1  )
s.t
n1 + n2 = 1  :
169
From rst order conditions we have that
n1 =

1  n2: (4.15)
We also know that in equilibrium the equation 1 + (1   )2 =  has unique
solutions only in two state of nature  = 0 and  = 1. When  = 0 , c1 =
c2 = 0 and when  = 1; c1 = c2 = 1. These two points coincide with noisy
vanishing equilibrium as well. Should we expect that the relation (4.15) holds in
noisy equilibrium?
In noisy equilibrium the problem (4.13) yields to the following Lagrangian:.
L = 1c1 + (1  )2c2    (1 + (1  )2   1 + )
First order conditions (FOC):
1 + 
0
1;c1
c1 + (1  )02;c1c2   01;c1   (1  )02;c1 = 0 (4.16)
2 + 
0
2;c2
c2   02;c2 = 0 (4.17)
But from (4.14)we have:
(1  )02;c1 =  01;c1
(1  )02;c2 = 0
what after substituting into FOC yields to:
(1(c2   c1))0 = 0
2 = 0
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so that n2 = 0 and (4.14) reduces to 1 = 1   ; we are in the case of one stage
selling. Also we should note that there is no way to endogenously derive c2 (although
formal solution of 2 = 0 is c2 = 1 but in fact it is revealed value of the project, i.e.
c2 = ): The conclusion is with the constraint (4.12) the optimal way of selling is
one stage selling.
However we know that for many reasons underwriter wants to sell in two stages
as providing liquidity, price support, etc. In order to be able to perform two stage
selling the underwriter has to impose additional constraints on the numbers of shares
sold in each stage. It is easy to show that in that case we can recover the relation
(4.15)31 As we do not consider explicitly the constraints for other reasons in this
model, in what follows we choose the pricing strategy by imposing the same share
allocation as in the noisy vanishing equilibrium that is:
1 = 2
Combining this with (4.14) we have in:
1(c1) = 1  
2(c1; c2) = 1  
Then we can solve the pricing strategy in the noisy equilibrium:
c1 = 
 s

+ 
 1()  p
+ 
(   1))
!
(4.18)
31 The constraints can be chosen to be of the following form 1 =  (1  ) and 2 = 1 1  (1  )
with   :
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c2 = 
r

+ 
 1()  p
+ 
(   c1))

(4.19)
The prices c1 and c2 under different market conditions
As discussed in the equilibrium conditions, the equation 1 + (1   )2 =
1    has a unique solution c1 = c2 =  in noisy vanishing equilibrium. The result
implies that the prices at both stages are the same. At this price level, there is always
a solution for the equilibrium regarding all  2 [0; 1].
In the noisy condition, we can derive the price from the equilibrium condition
by considering the following two scenarios:    and  < .
Figure 4.6: The prices c1 and c2 under different market conditions
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Figure 4.7: The relationship between u and  in two-stage selling.
Figure 4.6 illustrate the c1 and c2 in the equilibria under the two scenarios.32
The gure shows that when the precision in the rst stage is higher than in the second
stage, it is possible that the offering price is higher than the trading price in the rst
few days in secondary market.
We dene here the mispricing level u = c2 c1
c1
. When the precision in the rst
stage is lower than in the second stage, the shares are underpriced (u is positive) when
 is high, and are overpriced (u is negative) when  is low. In general, we consider
the investors in secondary market receive more precise information about the value
of shares ( < ). Therefore, the model implies that the underpricing, rather than
overpricing, signals for a better quality of IPO shares.
32 For the equilibrium regarding   , we assign the parameters as:  = 1,  = 3 and  = 2. For
the equilibrium regarding  < , we assign the parameters as:  = 1,  = 2 and  = 3.
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Further to the underpricing level, the model suggests the relationship between
underpricing (u) and the quality of IPO shares is non-monotone as shown in Figure
4.7.33 This implication of the model is consistent with the empirical observations
(Jain and Kini, 1994; Garnkel, 1993; Espenlaub and Tonks, 1998). When using the
sales of the IPO rms in the year after going public as the measure of the , the
non-monotone relationship is clear as well. (Figure 4.8)34
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Figure 4.8: Underpricing level and the quality of equity (sales as the signal ).
33 We assign the parameters as:  = 1,  = 1, and  = 10.
34 Source: Jay Ritter, 2008, "Some factoids about the 2007 IPO market", University of Florida,
http://bear.cba.u.edu/ritter.
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Issuers' choices between auction and bookbuilding
We assume that issuers choose the selling method regarding their proceeds in
the offering using different selling methods. To compare the proceeds, it is necessary
to discuss the proceeds in the noisy vanishing and noisy market conditions separately.
In the noisy vanishing condition, the proceed of the issuer in the auction is
pa = n  c = (1  ):
The proceed in the and the bookbuilding is
pb = n1c1 + n2c2 = (1  ):
Thus the proceeds are the same for the issuers in both selling methods.
Under the noisy condition, we show earlier that in the equilibrium n2 = 0 is the
optimal strategy for issuers to maximise their proceeds. When n2 = 0, the two-stage
selling turns to one-stage selling. Therefore, we conclude that the auction method is
better for issuers regarding the proceeds in the offering in both the noisy and noisy
vanishing market conditions. Nevertheless, we consider only the coordination prob-
lem in the model. In IPO practice, issuers need to consider other factors, including
share allocation to target investors, maintaining liquidity in secondary market and
so on. Although the bookbuilding method is not the best choice for maximising
proceeds, it allows issuers participate in the secondary market and the bookbuilding
method may help issuers to improve the IPO performance in other ways. In the Fig-
ure (4.9), we show the issuers' proceeds in one-stage selling and two-stage selling
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in the noisy equilibrium.35 It is worth to mention that proceeds are typically greater
in the region of overpricing for lower  when the effect of adverse selection is much
more pronounced.
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Figure 4.9: Issuers' proceeds in the auction and the bookbuilding methods in the
noisy equilibrium.
4.5 Concluding discussion
In this chapter we present a model of global games applied on the coordination prob-
lem in the IPO process and issuers' pricing strategy. In the model, we consider
the auction as one-stage selling method and the bookbuilding as two-stage selling
method.
35 We assign the parameters as:  = 1,  = 1,  = 10 and  = 0:6.
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The model suggests that there can be overpricing and underpricing in the noisy
market conditions, regarding the quality of IPO shares. In both the auction and the
bookbuilding method, the underpricing signals the higher quality of the investment
project while overpricing of IPO shares signals for lower quality of the investment
project. In addition, the relationship between underpricing level and the quality of
IPO shares is non-monotone. The model implies that the underpricing increases in
the region of lower quality and then decreases in the higher quality region. This
nding is consistent with empirical observations.
Further to the issuers' proceeds, the model suggests that the auction method
is always the best choice. Nevertheless, the model only considers the coordination
problem in the IPO process. Bookbuilding method allows issuers to participate in
the secondary market and it is possible that the bookbuilding method is helpful for
issuers in other ways, as it was mentioned.
It is noteworthy that the model does not consider the investors' demand side
in the secondary market. We plan to incorporate more information from the demand
side in future research. Also, one important aspect which can be studied in this
framework is the behaviour of "ippers" in the IPO process and their impact on prices
and stabilisation efforts of underwriters. In addition, the model can be extended to
other applications beyond IPO-related puzzles in the future.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
IPO is essentially the most important step in the life of a rm. Yet with re-
spect to nancial studies, IPO-related puzzles have not yet been fully resolved. This
thesis focuses on IPO-related puzzles, primarily on the underpricing problems, and
provides some new empirical evidence and theoretical explanations for them from
the perspective of a coordination problem.
Indeed, academic scholars have carried out profound investigations in this area
and have discovered a considerable number of puzzles related to the IPO process,
such as underpricing puzzle, and the long-term underperformance puzzle. Among all
of these, we selected the underpricing puzzle as the major concern of the thesis for
the following reasons. First, the underpricing puzzle is one of the few intrinsic char-
acteristics of the IPO process, and is the most unusual one. It is difcult to imagine
that assets can be undervalued by more than 5% in modern nancial markets, but it
does happen in the IPO process. In fact, IPO shares have been persistently under-
valued in the market, which is contrary to expectation given nancial practitioners'
common sense. For decades, issuers have kept leaving money on the table for the
investors in the primary market in IPO practice. Second, the underpricing puzzle is
a "real" puzzle. It has been shown to occur by empirical studies in more than 20
nancial markets around the world, which also excludes the possibility that the puz-
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zle is caused by securities regulations and different accounting standards. Other IPO
related puzzles, however, have only been witnessed in a few markets, or in certain
periods, and these are arguably caused by particular regulations or temporary events.
This thesis focuses on the IPO underpricing puzzle from both the empirical
and theoretical points of view. Rooted in the existing literature, the thesis aims at
exploring the following research questions: is the market liquidity important to the
underpricing level and the timing of going public? Is it possible that good underwrit-
ers are able to eliminate, or at least reduce the underpricing level? For what purpose,
do issuers deliberately undervalue the IPO shares in the primary market?
In this brief conclusion we wish to summarise the results found in the research
which are presented in Section 5.1, and to propose future research directions around
IPO puzzles, in Section 5.2.
5.1 Summary of the Research Project
The research commences with empirical studies on market liquidity. Chapter 2 fo-
cuses on the time series properties of the level of underpricing of IPO shares. The
regression test reveals strong auto-correlation within the level of underpricing. The
evidence from the Hong Kong market suggests the initial selling volume (by capi-
talisation) is a determinant factor in the relationship. In addition, we nd that the
relationship between the underpricing level and the clustering of IPOs within differ-
ent industries is weak in the IPO sample, suggesting the reasons for underpricing
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are rather related to the market liquidity than industry-specic risk characteristics.
This nding here suggests that market liquidity should be considered as an impor-
tant driving force for the IPO underpricing puzzle. In addition, it is possible that
deliberate undervaluation is an issuers' strategy in order to avoid liquidity risks.
As the offering strategy is mainly decided by underwriters, it is essential to
understand the underwriting business and how the underwriting syndicates work. In
Chapter 3, we investigate the underwriting network. The aim of the investigation is to
explore the relationship between the underwriting business and IPO-related puzzles.
We nd that in IPO practice, one of the advantages of the top ranked underwriters is
their relationship networks with other underwriters and institutional investors. Based
on these networks, the underwriters acquire market pricing information and distrib-
ute equities to the market. We perform a careful examination of the underwriter
syndicate and investigate the relationship of the structure of the syndicate to IPO per-
formance. In addition, the pattern of distribution in the size of syndicates is identied
as related to the IPO performance. The research also distinguishes two sub-groups of
underwriters using random graph analysis. It is true that the quality of underwriters
does not change the price of IPO shares, but the underwriters can be determinant in
the choice of pricing strategy. The results presented in Chapter 3 show that the per-
spective from the underwriters' syndicate is not only interesting, but also necessary
to the understanding of IPOs.
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In Chapter 4 we explore the reasons why issuers and underwriters deliberately
misprice the IPO shares in the primary market in order to decrease the risk of fail-
ure caused by insufcient number of investors participation and which method, the
auction or the bookbuilding, is better from the perspective of issuer's proceed The
research offers an explanation based upon the investors' coordination problem in
the IPO process in the framework of global game theory. The research suggests
that the relationship between the underpricing level and the quality of shares is non-
monotone, and this nding is consistent with the empirical observations .Also the
model shows that the auction method is the optimal choice for issuers allowing them
to solve coordination problems at greater proceeds. The analysis presented in Chapter
4 shows that in an environment where investors cannot receive precise information,
issuers' proceeds in IPOs are greater using the auction method than using the book-
building method. It is noteworthy that we only consider coordination problem in the
model. The bookbuilding method allows issuers to participate in secondary market
and can be helpful for issuers in maintaining liquidity for IPO shares and providing
price support.
By studying liquidity, business networks and the coordination problem, the the-
sis provides unique explanations for the IPO underpricing and other related puzzles,
and opens some interesting venues for future IPO research.
181
5.2 Suggestions for Future Research
Scholars have been aware of the IPO-related puzzles ever since they were rst noticed
by Ibbotson (1975) and Ritter (1984). Lots of efforts have been made to explain them
in both empirical and theoretical studies. Some new theories, such as behavioural
nance, are deeply rooted in IPO-related phenomena and exhibit their explanatory
power in those puzzles. Yet there is no doubt that these puzzles are still one of the
most important and challenging areas for scholars.
With respect to empirical studies, it is still necessary to conrm the other IPO-
related puzzles using empirical evidence. For example, empirical evidence about
the long-term underperformance puzzle in nancial markets outside the U.S. is rare
at the moment. The lack of sufcient empirical evidence leaves the possibility that
the puzzle could be a result of local regulation and accounting standards, but not
a universal phenomenon. In addition, the "book" needs to be carefully examined
in the bookbuilding system. Due to the condentiality of the book information in
the bookbuilding methods, only very limited information about the book has been
disclosed in the existing literature, which is still insufcient for empirical studies.
Underwriters' pricing strategies can only be clearly revealed when the details in the
books are made available.
It is also necessary to calibrate underwriters' reputations using a widely-accepted
standard. At the moment, the calibration of underwriters' reputations is always based
on the underwriters' service history in the local market. However, issuers do also
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consider the underwriters' business strength in international nancial markets as an
important factor. A precise calibration of underwriters' reputations also requires us
to monitor any change of reputation over time.
Further to the basic theoretical studies, existing literature focuses on informa-
tion asymmetry and investors' sentiment, but ignores the other risk factors, such as
the coordination risk. We elaborate the framework of the coordination problem in
the thesis, but this is only a start and presents preliminary ndings. If we could take
the investors' risk aversion into the conguration of the game, the outcome would be
more reliable. Thus a combination of behavioural nance and coordination problem
based considerations is the best way forward for future research.
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